N. R. Miller

November 2000

Revided April 2004

2nd rev. June 2004

3rd rev. January 2006
4th rev. July 2006


HOW DOES THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE TRANSLATE POPULAR VOTES INTO ELECTORAL VOTES?



          In the 1988 Presidential election, the Democratic ticket of Dukakis and Bentsen received 46.10% of the national popular vote and won 112 electoral votes (though one of these was lost to a “faithless elector”). Given state-by-state popular vote totals, we can display the relationship between Democratic popular and electoral votes in1988 by taking the actual state-by-state vote totals as the starting point and then considering how states would tip into or out the Democratic column in the face of a uniform national swing of varying magnitudes for or against the party. For example, a uniform national swing of 2.5% in favor of the Democrats would increase their national popular vote percent 46.1% to 48.6% and would shift every state they lost by less than 2.5% into the Democratic column.

          Refer to this table.

         (A)     The first column lists the states (plus DC) ordered in terms of the performance of the Democratic ticket in the 1988 Presidential election.

         (B)      The next two columns (DEM and REP) show the actual Democratic and Republican vote for President (Presidential electors) in 1988.

       (C)     The fouth (D2PC) column shows the Democratic percent of the two-party presidential vote (i.e., DEM / (DEM + REP), thereby excluding votes casts for minor parties) in each state.

       (D)     The fifth column (DSWG) is equal to 50 - D2PC. Each negative entry represents the magnitude of a uniform national swing against the Democrats that would just cost them the state in question. For example, Dukakis carried his home state of MA with 53.98% of the 2-party vote. Thus Dukakis would still carry MA in the face of a uniform national swing against him of up to 3.98% but would lose it in the face of a larger national swing. Each positive entry represents the magnitude of a uniform national swing in favor of the Democrats that would just gain them the state in question. For example, Dukakis lost the megastate of CA with 48.19% of the vote. Thus Dukakis would still lose CA with a uniform national swing in his favor of anything less than 1.81% but would win with any larger favorable national swing.

        (E)     The sixth column (DPOP) is equal to 46.10 + DSWG. It represents the Democratic national popular vote resulting from a uniform national swing just big enough to tip the state. For example, the 3.98% national swing against the Democrats just sufficient to tip MA into the Republican column results in a 42.12% national popular vote for the Democrats; the 1.81% in favor of the Democrats just sufficient to tip CA into the Democratic column results in a 47.91% national popular vote for the Democrats.

          (F)      The fifth column (EVCM) is the total electoral vote for the Democratic ticket cumulating from their strongest to weakest state.

 
         The fourth and fifth columns together allow us to examine the relationship between popular votes and electoral votes, taking the actual state-by-state 1988 vote as a baseline and considering uniform national swings in both directions from this baseline.

          Plotting EVCM against DPOP produces the monotonically increasing step function shown in this chart. The plot is monotonic because it assumes the increase in the Democratic national popular is uniform across states. It is a step function because electoral votes do not increase continuously with popular votes but rather in discrete increments (of no less than three votes) whenever another state tips into the Democratic column. Dukakis won 46.1% of the popular vote, which translated into 112 electoral votes. This is shown in the chart by the dashed green vertical and horizontal reference lines that intersect at the actual election outcome (DPOP = 46.1%, EVCM = 112). The table (and less clearly the chart ) shows that (under the uniform national swing assumption), if Dukakis had won exactly 50.00% of the popular vote, he would have won 252 electoral votes.  It further shows that, if Dukakis had won anything less than 50.08% of the national popular vote (based on a uniform swing in his favor of about four percentage points in every state), he would have won fewer than the 270 electoral votes required for election but, once he hit 50.0765%, Michigan would have tipped into the Democratic column and provided Dukakis with a winning electoral vote total of 280.   Thus 50.0765% was the pivotal vote percentage for Dukakis.

          The chart is partitioned into four equal quadrants by the solid black vertical and horizontal reference lines located at DPOP = 50% and EVCUM = 269. An election outcome located at the intersection of these lines is a perfect tie, with respect to both popular and electoral votes. Any outcome (including the actual outcome) in the southwest quadrant (“Rep Winner”) is one in which the Democrats lose both the popular and electoral votes, while one in the northwest quadrant (“Dem Winner”) is one in which they win both the popular and electoral votes.

          Assuming uniform national swings from the actual state-by-state popular vote, an Electoral College “wrong winner” (or “reversal of winners” or “misfire”) might have occurred given the 1988 baseline vote only if the plotted electoral vote function passes through either the northwest (“Wrong [Dem] Winner”) or southeast quadrants (“Wrong [Rep] Winner”) of the chart — which is to say, if fails to pass precisely through the perfect tie point at the center of the chart. (By monotonicity, the function can pass through at most one of the two wrong winner quadrants.) An outcome in the northwest quadrant entails a Democratic electoral vote victory with less than half of the two-party popular vote while an outcome in the southeast quadrant entail a Democratic electoral vote loss despite a popular vote majority. It is evident that, given any baseline vote, an electoral vote function will almost always fail to pass exactly through the precise center of the chart and that there is an essentially 50/50 chance that "wrong winner" may occur if the election is close enough with respect to electoral votes.  In 1988 there would have been a “wrong winner” (under the uniform swing assumption) if Dukakis had received between 50.0000% and 50.0765% of the popular vote; given any larger swing in his favor, Dukakis would have carried Michigan and 280 electoral votes. The reversal of winners popular vote interval is about .0765 percentage points wide.

<>           This chart  zooms in on the critical region in the vicinity of DPOP = 50% to show the "wrong winner area” of the electoral vote function chart.  This area is produced by multiplying the width of the wrong winner popular vote interval by the difference between electoral votes won at the the upper and lower bound of this interval.  In the present case, this area is the rectangle with its southwest corner at 50% and 252 and its northwest corner at 50.0765% and 280. This rectangle occupies about .000037 of the total area in the full chart (i.e., 100% × 538) or about .000296 of the maximum wrong winner rectangle, which is deemed to be 12.5% of the full chart.   The maximum wrong winner area occurs when a candidate receives a bare majority of popular votes in states with a bare majority of electoral votes and receives no popular votes in the remaining states (or, equivalently, when the other candidate falls ever so slightly behind in states with a bare majority of electoral votes and receives all the popular votes in the remaining states).  In a perfect single-member district system with uniform turnout across districts, this means that one candidate wins a minimal majority of districts with just over 25% of the popular vote, while the other candidate wins a maximal minority of districts with just under 75% of the popular vote. This produces of maximum “wrong winner” rectangle region equal to one-eighth (12.5%) of the total area of the electoral vote function chart. (See this chart, in which 51% should really be read as 50+ε% and likewise for other percentages.)

             This visualization of the relationship between popular and electoral votes makes clear that there are two distinct ways in which a “wrong winner” may occur. 

<>              The first is bias in the electoral vote function such that its general path clearly misses the perfect tie point and a substantial portion of it passes through either through the northwest quadrant or the southeast quadrant.   In times past (e.g., in the New Deal era -- see this chart for 1940), there was a clear bias against the Democrats such that the electoral vote function would have produced a “wrong of winner” if the Democratic ticket received between 50% and about 51.5% of the vote.  The bias resulted from Republican weakness in South, with the Democrats piling up wastefully large popular vote margins in the old "Solid South."  In 1940, the "reversal of winners" region occupies about .0065 of the potential space (see this zoom chart ), about 22 times larger than in 1988.  [Moreover, this bias would have been even more extreme if turnout had not been radically depressed in southern states at that time, with the result that overwhelming Democratic popular vote percentages were not as great ; see this adjusted chart, in which the "wrong winner" region occupies about .0313 of the potential area (also see this adjusted zoom chart), about 106 times larger than in 1988.]

          The grand daddy of all “wrong winners” occurred in 1860, which exhibits the same kind of bias as 1940 (and was also produced by extreme Republican weakness in the South) but in even more extreme degree. It is well known that with slightly less than 40% of the national popular vote, Lincoln won a comfortable electoral vote majority (180 out of 303) against a divided opposition. But this victory was quite different from, say, Wilson’s electoral vote majority (435 out of 531) victory against a divided opposition in 1912. Even if he had confronted a single non-Republican candidate able to assemble all Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell votes, Lincoln’s electoral vote total would have been only slightly reduced (whereas Wilson would have lost badly against a similarly united opposition). The only states that Lincoln actually won but would have lost against united opposition were California and Oregon (which he won by a pluralities against a divided opposition). He would have held every other state that he actually carried, because he carried them with an absolute majority of the popular vote. Though Douglas carried New Jersey, Lincoln (for peculiar reasons) won four of its seven electoral votes. Even if we shift these four electoral votes out of the Lincoln column along with the seven electoral votes from California and Oregon, Lincoln wins 169 electoral votes (with 39.8% of the popular vote) against 134 electoral votes (with 60.2% of the popular vote) for the united opposition. The 1860 electoral vote function for this scenario is displayed in this chart and this zoom chart, in which the “wrong winner” region occupies about .0922 of the potential space, over 300 times larger than in 1988.)

<>             In the present era, there appears to be no systematic bias in the electoral vote, but (as 2000 reminded us) "wrong winners" can still occur in close elections as a result of the “rounding error” (so to speak) necessarily entailed by the fact that the electoral vote function moves up in discrete steps (of varying height). While the general path of the electoral vote function may take it through point representing a perfect tie, the stepwise character of the precise path means that it almost certainly misses the perfect tie point. Thus a “wrong winner” essentially inevitably occurs in a very narrow popular vote interval on one or other side of the 50% popular vote mark.

          This possibility is clearly manifested by the 1988 chart, in which the electoral vote function exhibits no visible bias (at least in the critical region in the vicinity of DPOP = 50%). But as we saw in the earlier discussion of hypothetical uniform swing (and as was manifested in the actual outcome of the 2000 Presidential election), a "wrong winner" can occur in the absence of bias in the electoral vote function if the popular vote is extremely close.

          While it conveys no additional information, we can also construct a chart that superimposes the Republican electoral vote function on the Democratic electoral vote function and that makes evident any asymmetries between them when we look beyond the popular vote range close to 50%. It is evident that in 1988, there was no substantial asymmetry (despite talk on a Republican “electoral lock” on the Presidency).

          The 1988 electoral vote function (like any typical two-party “votes/seats” curve) displays an S-shape, with the result that the curve is of maximum steepness in the vicinity of PV = 50%. Indeed, 1988 function is extremely steep in that vicinity. The steepness of such a function in the vicinity of 50% (say from 45% to 55%) is commonly called the swing ratio and expresses the magnitude of the impact of a uniform swing 1% of the popular vote on the resulting shift in the seat (or electoral vote) distribution, expressed as a percent of the seats (or electoral votes). The well-known “cube law” that seemed to operate in Britain in earlier times implies a swing ratio of about 3 — that is, if a party were to gain (or lose) 1% percent of the popular votes, it would be expected to gain (or lose) about 3% of the seats in the House of Commons. We can calculate the swing ratio for electoral votes by examining the electoral vote function between DPOP = 45% and DPOP = 55% and measuring its slope (i.e., the slope of the regression line fitted to this portion of the electoral vote function) when the vertical axis has been converted into percent of electoral votes, rather than number of electoral votes. In 1988, the swing ratio was an exceptionally high 6.3.

          Charts similar to those for 1988 have been created for each Presidential election since 1828, as well as for other scenarios that result from pooling votes for minor and major candidates, which provides a basis for identifying “spoiler effects” of minor candidacies. Charts have also been created for scenario presented in Wrong Winner: The Coming Debacle in the Electoral College by David W. Abbott and James P. Levine. Note the wrong winner occurs because the electoral vote function has distinctive “shelf” built into it in the critical region that creates a substantial asymmetry in the electoral vote function. Nol electoral vote function based on actual popular vote data in a recent election exhibits such an asymmetry.

          For each election scenario, the following charts have been created:

LIST              List of states, sorted by Democratic Popular Vote Percentage, showing

                                STATE:        State Postal Code

                                 DEM             Democratic Popular Vote in the State

                                REP               Republican Popular Vote in the State 

                                D2PC:           Democratic Percent of the 2-Party Popular Vote

                            DSWNG       Swing from D2PC that would just tip the state into (positive swing) or out of (negative swing) the Democratic column

                                DPOP           Democratic National Popular Vote Percent associated with DSWG (assuming swing is uniform across all states

                                EVCUM        Cumulative Democratic Electoral Vote

 

PVEV            Electoral Vote Function (the plot of EVCUM by DPOP), i.e., the translation popular votes into electoral votes, given the baseline or “landscape” associated with D2PC.   The actual Democratic popular vote percent and electoral vote total is shown, as well the the electoral vote that the Democratic candidate would have won with exactly 50.00% of the national popular vote.

 

EVDR           PVEV with corresponding Cumulative Republican Electoral Vote superimposed (to show any asymmetries/biases in the Electoral Vote Function)

 

STATES       Truncated version of PVEV without interpolation between points and with points identified by STATE code. (Note: each label appears slightly above the [almost invisible] plotted point.)

 

ZOOM          A “zoom in” of PVEV at its center, i.e., in the vicinity of DPOP = 50% that

                     (i)       identifies EVCUM for DPOP = 50% (i.e., the number of electoral votes the Democratic ticket would win when it gets just 50% of the popular vote);

                     (ii)      identifies DPOP when EVCUM first constitutes a winning majority (270 at present); and

                     (iii)      calculates the “wrong winner area,” i.e., the area of the rectangle shown in the zoom chart defined by the two points given by (i) and (ii), as a proportion of the maximum area (12.5%) of the PVEV chart that is logically subject to a possible “wrong winner.”

 

MAP             The standard electoral vote map of the election outcome.

 

PIVOT          An hypothetical electoral vote map that identifies the pivotal state on the LIST, together with the more Democratic and more Republican states. In effect, this is what the electoral map would have looked like (given the uniform swing assumption) in the closest possible electoral vote division that year (the winner being determined by the pivotal state).

 

PIVOT2        PIVOT with color tones showing relative party strength

 

PVEVS         PVEV without Senatorial Bonus of 2 electoral votes for every state

 

 

 

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SCENARIOS

 

1828                        Jackson vs. Adams (Nat. Rep.) 1

1832X                      Jackson vs. Clay (Whig) 1

1832A                      Jackson vs. Clay (Whig) + Wirt (Anti-Masonic)

1836X                      Van Buren vs. Harrison + Webster + White (Whig) 2

1840                        Van Buren vs. Harrison (Whig)

1844                        Polk vs. Clay (Whig)

1848                        Cass vs. Taylor (Whig)

1852                        Pierce vs. Scott (Whig)

1852A                      Pierce vs. Scott (Whig) + Hale (Free Soil)

1856X                      Buchanan vs. Fremont (Rep.) 3

1856A                      Buchanan vs. Fremont (Rep.) + Fillmore (Whig-Am.)

1860A                       Douglas (N. Dem.) + Breckinridge (S. Dem.) + Bell (Const. U.) vs. Lincoln (Rep.)4

1860B                      Douglas (N. Dem.) + Breckinridge (S. Dem.) vs. Lincoln (Rep.)

1860C                      Douglas (N. Dem.) + Breckinridge (S. Dem.) vs. Lincoln (Rep.) + Bell (Const. U.)

1864                        McClellan vs. Lincoln

1868                        Seymour vs. Grant

1872                        Greely vs. Grant 5

1876                        Tilden vs. Hayes

1880                        Hancock vs. Garfield

1880A                      Hancock + Weaver (Greenback) vs. Garfield

1884                        Cleveland vs. Blaine

1888                        Cleveland vs. Harrison

1892X                      Cleveland vs. Harrison 6

1892A                      Cleveland + Weaver (Pop.) vs. Harrison

1892B                      Cleveland vs. Harrison + Weaver (Pop.)

1896                        Bryan vs. McKinley

1900                        Bryan vs. McKinley

1904                        Parker vs. Roosevelt

1908                        Bryan vs. Taft

1912X                      Wilson vs. Taft 7

1912XX                   Wilson vs Roosevelt (Prog.) 8

1912A                      Wilson vs. Taft + Roosevelt (Prog.)

1912B                      Wilson + Roosevelt (Prog.) vs. Taft

1912C                     Wilson + Debs (Soc.) vs. Taft + Roosevelt (Prog.)

1916                        Wilson vs. Hughes

1916A                      Wilson + Benson (Soc.) vs. Hughes

1920                        Cox vs. Harding

1920A                      Cox + Debs (Soc.) vs. Harding

1924X                      Davis vs. Coolidge 9

1924A                      Davis + LaFollette (Prog.) vs. Coolidge

1924B                      Davis vs. Coolidge + LaFollette (Prog.)

1928                        Smith vs. Hoover

1932                        Roosevelt vs. Hoover

1936                        Roosevelt vs. Landon

1940                        Roosevelt vs. Willkie

1940S                      Roosevelt vs. Willkie (Southern turnout adjusted 10 )

1944                        Roosevelt vs. Dewey

1948X                      Truman vs Dewey 11

1948A                      Truman + Thurmond (S.R Dem.) + Wallace (Prog.) vs. Dewey

1948B                      Truman + Wallace (Prog.) vs. Dewey + Thurmond (S.R Dem.)

1952                        Stevenson vs. Eisenhower

1956                        Stevenson vs. Eisenhower

1960X                      Kennedy vs. Nixon 12

1964                        Johnson vs. Goldwater

1968X                      Humphrey vs. Nixon

1968A                      Humphrey + Wallace (AIP) vs. Nixon

1968B                      Humphrey vs. Nixon + Wallace (AIP)

1972                        McGovern vs. Nixon

1976                        Carter vs. Ford

1980                        Carter vs. Reagan

1980A                      Carter + Anderson (Ind.) vs. Reagan

1980B                      Carter vs. Reagan + Anderson (Ind.)

1984                        Mondale vs. Reagan

1988                        Dukakis vs. Bush

1992                        Clinton vs. Bush

1992A                      Clinton vs. Bush + Perot (Ind.)

1992B                      Clinton + Perot (Ind.) vs. Bush

1996                        Clinton vs. Dole

1996A                      Clinton vs. Dole + Perot (Reform)

1996B                      Clinton + Perot (Reform) vs. Dole

1996Z                      Clinton vs. Dole using Districted Electoral Vote System

2000                        Gore vs. Bush

2000A                      Gore + Nader (Green) vs. Bush

2000B                      Gore vs. Bush + Buchanan (Reform)

2000C                     Gore + Nader (Green) vs. Bush + Buchanan (Reform)

2000CD                  Gore vs. Bush  (based on Congressional Districts)

2000Z                      Gore vs. Bush using Districted Electoral Vote System

2000WW                 Bradley vs. Quayle (Wrong Winner) 13

2004                        Kerry vs. Bush

 

Note 1. In elections in which a third candidate wins electoral votes (by winning state-wide pluralities), the basic chart applies the uniform swing assumption to the Democratic vs. Republican candidate contest, while holding the third candidate's popular vote constant. As a result, some electoral votes are out-of-play and there are three possible electoral vote outcomes: a Democratic majority, a Republican majority, and an Electoral College deadlock. Such charts are indicated as, for example, 1968X. Note that a third candidate may fail to win a popular vote plurality in a state but, if he wins more than one-third of the popular vote in that state, he would win a popular vote plurality (and the state’s electoral votes) if the remaining votes were sufficiently equally divided between the Democratic and Republican candidates.   Conversely, a third candidate may win a popular popular vote plurality (and the state's electoral votes) of less than 50% but would fail to do so if the remaining votes were sufficiently unequally divided between the Democratic and Republican candidates.   For example, in 1968 Wallace received 48% of the vote in Louisiana, 43% in Georgia, 39% in Arkansas, and 34% in Tennessee, carrying all but TN (which Nixon carried by a plurality) by pluralities over both Humphrey and Nixon.   However, Humphrey or Nixon would have carried LA, GA, and AR given large enough swinjgs in their favor (holding the Wallace vote constant).  On the other hand, a small swing towards Humphrey would have tipped TN to Wallace (and a  still larger one would have tipped the state to Humphrey).   Thus the plot of the  Wallace electoral vote by DPOP is an shallow inverted U (see this chart).

Note 2. Since1828 onwards, electors have almost always been popularly elected on a general ticket (i.e., as a party slate). However, South Carolina electors were appointed by the legislature through 1860 and invariably cast all their votes for Democrats. (In 1832 and 1836, these electoral votes were cast for Democrats other than the national Democratic nominees; in these two years the South Carolina electoral votes are deemed to be out of play in the two-party analysis, so an EC deadlock might result.) In other years, the Democratic candidate is credited with the SC electoral votes from DPOP = 0 onwards. In 1868, the Florida legislature cast the states electoral votes (for Grant).  In 1876, the Colorado legislature appointed its electors, which were cast for Hayes. In the analysis, Seymour and Tilden are not credited with the FL or CO electoral votes even at DPOP = 100.

Note 3. Because of the general-ticket system for electing pledged electors, a state’s electoral are normally undivided. However, divisions in state electoral votes occur in three circumstances: (i) when electors violate their pledges (as a single elector has done in each of these elections: 1956, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1988, and 2000); (ii) when electors are elected at large but not on a general ticket (as happened occasionally in the 19th century and also in Alabama in 1960); and (iii) when electors are elected from districts rather than statewide (as happened in Michigan in 1892; Nebraska and Maine have elected electors by district for several elections but this has never resulted in a divide state electoral vote). At least one state split its electoral votes (or an elector failed to vote) in each of the following elections: 1828, 1832, 1860, 1864, 1872, 1880, 1892, 1896, 1904, 1908, 1912, 1916, 1948, 1956, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1988, and 2000.  Since the PVEV charts always credit the state popular vote winner with all the electoral votes of the state, the electoral vote totals for candidates in these elections differ slightly from the official record. 

Notes on Inividual Elections 

1828.   Maine, Maryland, and New York cast split electoral votes, with the result that Jackson won 178 to 83 for Adams.  As always, the analysis credits the popular vote winner in a state with all of its electoral votes.

1832.   Wirt (Anti-Masonic) carried Vermont and was the only opposition to Clay in Pennsylvania.   Maryland split its electoral votes and failed to cast two votes entirely, with the result that Jackson won 219 electoral votes to 49 for Clay, 11 (from SC; see Note 2) for Floyd, and 7 for Wirt.

<>1836     The Whig <>Party ran three different candidates in different regions of the country but only one Whig candidate was on the ballot in any individual state.  The analysis treats this as a normal two-party election.

 so this is treated as a normal two-party election.

3.         Fremont received no more than a smattering of votes in any slave state, so Fillmore provided the only opposition to Buchanan in these states (and he actually carried Maryland).

4.         Lincoln received no more than a smattering of votes in any slave state, and Douglas received few votes in the slave states. Breckinridge and Bell received few votes outside of the slave states. However, Breckinridge provided the main opposition to Lincoln in Pennsylvania. Lincoln received four of seven electoral votes from New Jersey, though Douglas carried the state. In the analysis, Douglas is credited with all seven electoral votes.

5.         Greely died between the Presidential election and the casting of electoral votes. Congress refused to count three electoral votes cast for Greely himself; his electoral votes were scattered among four other candidates.  Congress also refused to count the electoral votes of Arkansas and Louisiana (which Grant had carried), because of disruptive consitions during Reconstruction.  In the analysis, this is treated as a normal two-party election with all electotal votes allocated on the basis of which party slate of electors carried the popular vote in each state.

6.         Weaver carried Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and Nevada. A number of states split their electoral votes. As always, the analysis credits all electoral votes to the popular vote winner in each state.

7.         Theodore Roosevelt carried six states and received more than one-third of the vote in many others (and came in second in the national popular vote).

8.         Taft carried two states and received more than one-third of the vote (and/or came in second) in many others.

9.         LaFollete carried Wisconsin and received more than one-third of the vote is a number of states.

10.       It is assumed that the total popular vote of each southern state is equal to that in a non-southern state with the same number of electoral votes (the average of such states if there are several or by interpolation if there is none) and that this popular vote is divided between the candidates in the same proportions as the actual popular vote. This adjustment changes the electoral vote function but does not affect the maps.  Note that it is in effect assumed that the additional popular votes in the South would have gone Democratic in the same proportion as the votes actually cast.  These additional votes would have come mostly from disenfrachised blacks (plus some poor whites), who probably would have voted heavily Democratic fro 1936 onwards, but the blacks at least would have voted heavily Republican prior to the New Deal.

11.       Thurmond received no more than a smattering of votes outside of the South. He carried Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina with with over 50% of the vote and Louisiana with just under 50% but did not receive one-third (or even one quarter) of the vote in any state he did not carry.  Wallace did not receive one quarter of the vote in any state.  Truman was not on the ballot in Alabama and could not receive any votes, so Alabama must be excluded from uniform national swing calculations.

12.       A slate of unpledged electors won a plurality of votes in Mississippi; however a Kennedy-pledged elector slate won more than one third of the votes. In Alabama, electors were elected statewide but not on a general ticket; moreover, six of the eleven Democratic electors (all of whom were elected) were unpledged. In the analysis, Kennedy is credited with the popular vote of the leading Kennedy-pledged elector and Nixon is credited with the popular vote of the leading Republican elector. However, Kennedy is credited with no more than the five electoral votes from Alabama that he actually won. The other six Alabama electoral votes, together with those of MS (while the Kennedy vs. Nixon vote is sufficiently close that the unpledged elector plurality is maintained), are considered to be out-of-play in the Kennedy-Nixon contest.

13.       This is based on the scenario presented in Wrong Winner: The Coming Debacle in the Electoral College by David W. Abbott and James P. Levine. Note that the wrong winner occurs because the electoral vote function has a “shelf” built into it in the critical region near 50%. As can be checked, no actual electoral vote function in the present era has exhibited such a shelf.

 

 

1828        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1832X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1832A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1836X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1840        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1844        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1848        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1852        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1852A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1856X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1856A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1860X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1860A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1860B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1860C     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1864        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1868        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1872        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1876        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1880        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1880A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1884        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1888        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1892X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1892A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1892B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1896        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1900        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1904        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1908        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1912X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1912XX   LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1912A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1912B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1916        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1916A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1920        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1920A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1924X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1924A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1928        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1932        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1936        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1940        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1940S     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1944        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1948X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1948A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1948B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1952        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1956        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1960X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1964        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1968X     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1968A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1968B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1972        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1976        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1980        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1980A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1980B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1984        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1988        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1992        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1992A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1992B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1996        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1996A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1996B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

1996Z      LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2000        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2000A     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2000B     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2000C     LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2000CD  LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2000Z      LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2000WW LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS

2004        LIST        PVEV      EVDR      STATES  ZOOM     MAP        PIVOT     PIVOT2   EVDRS


SUMMARY TABLE:  WRONG WINNER MARGINS AND SWING RATIOS