Executive Summary- The US and USSR in Afghanistan

              For my research paper, I chose to study the proxy war that took place in Afghanistan from the late 1970’s through the mid 1980’s. The conflict itself was one of the prime examples of how the Cold War, after a fashion, actually went hot. Though the two parties never openly engaged one another, their respective motivation to take action in the region was to undermine the other’s interests. The topic itself is significant in that it displays a number of game theory principles in action. Furthermore, the conflict is a prime example of the strategic interactions that define defense and deterrence, and also illustrates the impact that nuclear weapons have upon modern conflicts.

              In some ways, the proxy war in Afghanistan represented a zero-sum game, where by the Soviet Union and the United States found themselves staring one another down. President Reagan’s firm stance in opposition to Soviet expansion and his determination to use economic might to bleed the Soviets dry was in stark opposition to the unswerving Soviet intention to bring a rogue part of their perceived communist empire under firm control. Thus, a victory for one side was a loss for the other; such was the case, as neither side backed down, which ultimately resulted in the crippling of the Soviet economy.

              Insofar as nuclear strategy is concerned, the Afghanistan proxy war was in large part the result of both the US and USSR possessing a secure second strike capability. The war took place during the time when the nuclear arms race had grown such that Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was considered the status quo in bipolar politics. Thus, neither power dared engage the other openly for fear that their opponent would retaliate with nuclear weapons. Thus, proxy wars such as Vietnam and the Afghanistan conflict replaced what, in a pre-nuclear era, likely would have been open war.