Joshua C. Hunter

POLI 388

Executive Summary

The Suez Crisis of 1956: Britain and France vs. Egypt

            This crisis was a small, but significant event in the context of the much larger crisis of the Cold War. The series of events that lead to the eventual military engagement of these two "players" (Britain and France against Egypt) could be considered one of sequential moves, in the mold of the "spiral model," where each move raised the costs for the opponent. Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 for financial benefit; it sought to secure funding for an expensive construction project (the Aswan High Dam). Britain and France had vested interests in maintaining an independent Suez Canal Company, as the British government and French citizens were shareholders in the company. In reaction to the nationalization, Britain and France half-heartedly pressed for international backing in terms of seeking an immediate "diplomatic" solution, while making plans for military engagement. Rhetoric on both sides inflated the political costs of either side backing-down, so to speak. The payoffs were both financial and political, as the British and French would lose what Egypt would gain, both in terms of financial benefits of maintaining ownership of the company, and political benefits, where the former colonial powers would lose political prestige, where Egypt would stand to gain it. The result was a relatively small military engagement, initiated by Israel (which played a small role compared to Britain and France) in the lead-up to the conflict) whose end was in part effected by the U.S.' lack of commitment to involvement, and the U.S.S.R.'s threat of commitment; Egypt was able to convert the abrupt end of the conflict into a victory for it as a leader of the Arab world against former colonial empires.