POLI 388 — INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

1.         Why do nations (and other actors) sometimes play “chicken”?

2.         Why do rational actors often pursue self-defeating courses of action? And why is it sometimes rational to appear to be “irrational”?

3.         Why do nations (and other actors) sometimes engage in “brinksmanship”? (And why is “brinksmanship” an inappropriate metaphor?)

4.         Why do statesman (and others) sometimes have to lie in order to tell the truth? And why does telling the truth sometimes deceive others?

5.         Why do nations (and other actors) often sink so many resources into trying to win a conflict that that the value of the resources far exceed the value of what is at stake in the conflict?

6.         What is the difference between “defense” and “deterrence”? Between “deterrence” and “compellence”? Between “preventive” and “pre-emptive” action?

7.         What determines which “commitments” the U.S. (or other nations) will honor and which it will not?

8.         Why did it make sense for the U.S. to keep 5,000 lightly armed soldiers in West Berlin during the Cold War, even though they were surrounded by dozens of heavily armed Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions?

9.         Why is “credibility” especially important in international politics and how is credibility protected or lost?

10.       How do “bargaining chips” work in international arms control (and many other) negotiations?

11.       Why has nuclear proliferation proceeded so slowly (at least until recently)?

12.       Why was nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union a bit more probable in the last decade of the Cold War than in the mid-1960s but much less probable than in the mid-1950s?

13.       Is civil defense ever effective in the nuclear age? Is it ever dangerous?

14.       Why is it possible to extract advantages by holding hostages but also inherently difficult to realize these advantages?

15.       In what sense does the U.S. [still] hold a large portion of the Russian population “hostage” (and vice versa), and how might these international hostages be “freed”?

16.       What was the evolution of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the course of Cold War?

17.       Why did the U.S. rely on “strategic deterrence” throughout the Cold War? Is this posture now obsolete?

18.       What is the meaning of strategic “superiority” or “parity” or “sufficiency” and what factors determine these relationship between adversaries?

19.       What are the strategic consequences of spy satellites, MIRVs (Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles), ABMs (Anti-Ballistic Missile systems), and the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreements?

20.       Why is “arms control” an aspect of military strategy and how would “deterrence” operate in a “disarmed” world?