THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE DURING THE COLD WAR


 

 

 

Soviet Union

 

NUCLEAR

CAPABILITY

MATRIX

 

Non-preclusive First strike Capability Only

Preclusive First Strike Capability

Secure

Second Strike Capability

 

Non-preclusive First Strike Capability

Only

 

SU Superiority

(1985??)

United

States

Preclusive First Strike Capability

U.S. Monopoly (1945-1952)


and


U.S. Superiority (1962-1967)

Delicate Balance

 (1953-1961

& 1985??)

 

 

Secure Second Strike Capability.

 

Mutual Deterrence (MAD)

(1968 - ??)

 

D1 =  Damage (negative payoff) US could inflict on SU in all-out countervalue first strike

D2 =  Damage US could inflict on SU in all-out countervalue second strike (after absorbing an all-out counterforce first strike by the SU),

Presumably always so D2 < D1 so D2 is SU’s “minimax” payoff, and D1 - D2 is SU’s “penalty for waiting to strike second.”

Likewise d1 and d2 = damage SU could inflict on US and d1 - d2 is US’s penalty for waiting to strike second.

The strategic balance is unstable (or “delicate’) to the extent that D1 exceeds D2 and d1 exceeds d2, i.e., instability can be measured by (D1 - D2) × (d1 - d2) — also referred to as the incentive to pre-empt producing the reciprocal fear of surprise attack (Schelling).

 

                                                   D1                  D2                d1                   d2

U.S. Monopoly                        modest            modest         zero                zero                 stable

Delicate Balance                     large               small             large               small                unstable

U.S. Superiority                       large               large             large               small                stable

Mutual Deterrence (MAD)      large               large             large                large                stable

“Mutual Defense”                  small               small             small                small                stable