REVIEW OF STRATEGIC SITUATIONS: SIMPLE 2×2 PAYOFF MATRICES



The Row Player chooses a row. The Column Player chooses a column. The number in the lower left corner of each cell is the prospective payoff to the Row Player, and the number in the upper right left corner of each cell is the prospective payoff to the Column Player, in the event the players make the choices that result in that cell. These payoff are common knowledge to both players. Each player aims to maximize his own payoff. Strictly speaking, payoff numbers have only ordinal significance.



 

1          An Unproblematic Zero-Conflict Game (No Coordination Problem)


        3

 3

       4

 4

        1 1

       2

 2



 

2.         A Problematic Zero-Conflict Game (A Coordination Game)


        3 3

        0 0

        0 0

        3 3



 

3.         A Coordination Game with Conflict of Interest (Battle of the Sexes)


        3 2

        0 0

        0 0

        2 3



 


4.         A Strictly Determined Zero-Sum Game [with a Pure Strategy Equilibrium]

                                                (Battle of the Bismark Sea)


        2 -2

        3 -3

        1 -1

        4 -4



 

5.         A Non-Strictly Determined Zero-Sum Game [without a Pure Strategy Equilibrium,

so Mixed Strategies are optimal] (D-Day Invasion)


        3 -3

        2 -2

        1 -1

        4 -4



 

6.         A Prisoner’s Dilemma Game


        3 3

        4 1

        1 4

        2 2



 

7.         A Chicken Game


           0 0

         +2 -2

         -2 +2

       -10 -10