GUIDE TO FINAL EXAM

The **Final Exam** is scheduled for **Monday, May 17, 1:00-3:00 PM in PUP 206**. Please see me in advance if this time presents a real problem for you.

The Final Exam will have four parts. The first two parts (accounting for about 40% of the exam) will focus on material covered since the in-class midterm test (this includes the material on the Cuban Missile Crisis and student presentations and/or “executive summaries”), and it will be generally similar in format to the written Part I of that test — that is, it will be composed of short-answer items with some choice, but it will not include any “problem set” type of questions. The second two parts (accounting for about 60% of the exam) will be more comprehensive and integrative in nature, asking you to bring together material presented in different parts of the course. It will include a mixture of shorter and more specific questions and a more general essay question. In all parts of the exam, you will have some choice either among or within questions.

Items in the first part of the final will be drawn from the following Review List, together with some additional items drawn from student presentations and/or “executive summaries” posted on the course website. Note that this Review List includes items (pertaining to bargaining tactics) that also appeared on the Review List for the Midterm. Not all items on the Review List are equally important, and the exam will certainly emphasize more important items rather than less important ones. More specifically, some of the items on the Review List are unlikely to be used as questions but you might well use them within answers to other questions. Familiarity with the items on this Review List will also enable you to cite specific facts, examples, concepts, issues, etc., in your answers for the second part of the final, and such specifics certainly will be rewarded in the grading. (This point applies also with respect items on the Review List for the mid-term exam, so you should study the earlier Review List again as well as this new one.)

For purposes of general review and especially in preparation for the second part of the final exam, it is recommended that you review the list of questions pertaining to international conflict and cooperation that was distributed with the syllabus at the beginning of the semester and also attached to the Guide and think about how you would now answer them. You should recognize that we have addressed some of these questions explicitly and at considerable length, others more indirectly and briefly, and some not at all; their relevance for the final exam varies accordingly. You should also think about how the strategic concepts we have considered in this course (summarized in the Review Lists for the mid-term and final exams) apply to various international crises and conflicts. (You have already thought about such applications with respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis and also, presumably, with respect to your research topic.) Finally you should think about whether (and why) you find these strategic concepts to be useful in understanding such events — or, as the case may be, not so useful or even misleading.

Remember that several topics and readings have been deleted from the syllabus. Topics #8 and #9 were deleted, Topic #18 was covered by the Robert Kennedy book, the take-home assignment, and the Answers & Discussion handout for that assignment but not otherwise. Topic #22 was covered only in small part in the PPT slides on Nuclear Deterrence. Remember also that the readings by Masterman and Payne listed on the original syllabus were cancelled. However, Masterman (*The Double-Cross System*) was explicitly covered in class, and the Appeasement Theory vs. Spiral Model Theory of war discussion presented in class was based in part on Payne’s book (*The American Threat*), though Payne calls the latter the “Excitation Theory of War.”
Course grades (A, B, C, D, F) will be available from the Registrar (through myUMBC) on June 3 or thereabouts. However, as soon as they are ready (hopefully by June 1, if not sooner), I will post grades for the final exam and the research project, together with course grades, on the course website for all students who explicitly ask me to do this by checking a box on the final exam. (If you request this, your grade will be identified by the five digits of your Campus ID Number. Grades will be listed by numerical ID order, not by alphabetical order of last names, in order to preserve maximum anonymity.)

**Review List for Final Exam**

generic bargaining (Chicken) game: “give in” vs. “stand firm”
bargaining tactics
pre-play communications
rationality of irrationality
credible commitment
reputation effects
strategic move (as defined by Schelling and D&N)
irrevocable commitment
the art of commitment
trip wire system
the threat that leave something to chance
doomsday machine
last clear chance effect
decomposing the execution of a threat
generalized deterrence
surprise attack
signals vs. noise
secrecy and deception
signal vs. index
manipulation of indices
lying vs. deception
intercepting/decoding enemy messages
Magic and the Ultra-Secret
cycles of deception
“turning” agents into double-agents
Double-Cross System
defense vs. deterrence
offense vs. compellence
deterrence vs. compellence
unconditional vs. conditional commitment
threat vs. promise
threat vs. warning
promise vs. assurance
Hostage Holding Game
observability of successful vs. unsuccessful deterrence
observability of successful deterrence vs. compellence
art of decommitment
conditions for successful deterrence
Appeasement Theory of War
appeasement policy
Spiral Model Theory of War
security dilemma
Stag Hunt (Assurance) Game
Pre-emption Game
pre-emptive vs. preventive war
Cuban Missile Crisis
origins of Cold War
impact of nuclear weapons on international politics
U.S. nuclear monopoly
“massive retaliation”
nuclear duopoly
countervalue vs. counterforce targeting
preclusive vs. non-preclusive first strike capability
RAND Report on the Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases
Wohlstetter, “Delicate Balance of Terror”
Wohlstetter’s “six hurdles” for deterrence
vulnerability of strategic weapons
secure second-strike capability
accidental war and “fail-safe” systems
“missile gap”
the U.S. nuclear “triad”
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
“flexible response”
mutual deterrence/mutual assured destruction (MAD)/mutual assured vulnerability
extended deterrence
controlled response
“No Cities” doctrine
on-going Prisoner’s Dilemma with and without perfect information
reconnaissance satellites
multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs)
strategic defense and ABM treaty

Remember that the scheduled time and place for the final exam is Monday, May 17, 1:00-3:00 PM, in PUP 206. Please see me in advance if this time presents a real problem for you. Research Reports are due Friday, May 21 by email.
1. Why do nations (and other actors) sometimes play “chicken”?

2. Why do rational actors often pursue self-defeating courses of action? And why is it sometimes rational to appear to be “irrational”?

3. Why do nations (and other actors) sometimes engage in “brinksmanship”? (And why is “brinksmanship” an inappropriate metaphor?)

4. Why do statesman (and others) sometimes have to lie in order to tell the truth? And why does telling the truth sometimes deceive others?

5. Why do nations (and other actors) often sink so many resources into trying to win a conflict that the value of the resources expended far exceed the value of what is at stake in the conflict?

6. What is the difference between “defense” and “deterrence”? Between “deterrence” and “compellence”? Between “preventive” and “pre-emptive” action?

7. What determines which “commitments” the U.S. (or other nations) will honor and which it will not?

8. Why did it make sense for the U.S. to keep 5,000 lightly armed soldiers in West Berlin during the Cold War, even though they were surrounded by dozens of heavily armed Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions?

9. Why is “credibility” especially important in international politics and how is credibility protected or lost?

10. How do “bargaining chips” work in international arms control (and many other) negotiations?

11. Why has nuclear proliferation proceeded so slowly (at least until recently)?

12. Why was nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union a bit more probable in the last decade of the Cold War than in the mid-1960s but much less probable than in the mid-1950s?

13. Is civil defense ever effective in the nuclear age? Is it ever dangerous?

14. Why is it possible to extract advantages by holding hostages but also inherently difficult to realize these advantages?

15. In what sense does the U.S. [still] hold a large portion of the Russian population “hostage” (and vice versa), and how might these international hostages be “freed”?

16. What was the evolution of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the course of Cold War?

17. Why did the U.S. rely on “strategic deterrence” throughout the Cold War? Is this posture now obsolete?

18. What is the meaning of strategic “superiority” or “parity” or “sufficiency” in the nuclear age and what factors determine these relationship between adversaries?

19. What are the strategic consequences of spy satellites, MIRVs (Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles), ABMs (Anti-Ballistic Missile systems), and the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreements?

20. Why is “arms control” an aspect of military strategy and how would “deterrence” operate in a “disarmed” world?