TOPIC #14 — AMERICAN FEDERALISM
This enhanced study guide takes the place of a class [and PowerPoint slides] on this topic. Read Chapter 3 in Kernell and Jacobson; it is clear and complete. We have already discussed some of the issues presented in this chapter, e.g., differences among federal, confederal, and unitary systems. We will subsequently discuss some others, e.g., the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, the enumerated powers of Congress, and the “supremacy” clause of the Constitution.
U.S. invention of federalism. Federalism (as distinct from both unitary and confederal systems) was one of the most novel political inventions of the framers; it had no precedent, but it has since been copied in the constitutions of many other nations (e.g., Canada, Australia, India, and post-WWII Germany).
Federalism vs. decentralization. Not all democratic nations are federal; many (e.g., Britain [with many oddities], France, and Italy) are unitary. However, such unitary central governments may choose to decentralize in some degree, i.e., to create local and/or regional government units and delegate certain powers to them. But decentralization (or devolution, to use the contemporary British term) does not make these systems federal — the central government that created these local governments and delegated powers to them can modify them or (in principle) abolish them at will. Note: the U.S. states are themselves unitary, not federal, in nature, though they have also decentralized by creating local governments (counties, municipalities, school districts, etc.).
Dual vs. Shared Federalism. Despite the simple formula of delegated (federal) vs. reserved (state) powers, the allocation of powers and functions between the two levels of government is overlapping, highly ambiguous, and subject to widely differing interpretations. As a practical matter, the allocation is extremely complex and contested, and it has changed over time. There is a famous metaphor (due to a political scientist named Morton Grodzins) pertaining to the layer cake vs. marble cake views of federalism that illustrates this complexity: federal vs. state (and local) powers and functions are not cleanly divided (like the colors of a “layer cake” or as in the doctrine of dual federalism) but are complexly intermingled (like the colors of a “marble cake” or as in shared federalism). In large part, this is because — even as the role of the federal government in domestic social and economic affairs has expanded greatly since the New Deal — few domestic "federal" programs are operated directly by the federal government (Social Security and Medicare are notable exceptions). Instead most "federal" programs (Medicaid, Unemployment Insurance, school lunches, Head Start, Interstate Highways, etc.) are actually operated by state (and local) governments using federal funds (see "grants-in-aid" below) and subject to federal regulations.
Social Federalism. Federalism makes an especially large political difference because the states are not little replicas or each other, or of the U.S. as a whole; the states are somewhat distinctive in terms of their geography, history, interests, political cultures, public opinion, partisanship, etc. — this is sometimes called social federalism and is related to Madison's argument in Federalist 10. Historically, the most important way in which states have varied has been with respect to their racial compositions and arrangements — most particularly, the division between "slave" and "free" states prior to the Civil War and between
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"Jim Crow" and non-Jim Crow states for some 100 years thereafter. (These matters will be discussed in Topic #20.)
Constitutional disputes vs. policy disputes. Because of federalism, many issues that would be straightforward policy disputes (should the government do X or not?) in unitary systems get cast into constitutional disputes (is X one of the delegated powers of the federal government or is it one of the reserved powers of the states?) in the U.S.
Nationalization. Despite all this complexity and contestation, there is one clear overall trend in federal-state relations: over time the federal government has become larger and more "powerful" relative to the state governments. Especially large "jumps" in federal "power" occurred with the Civil War and its aftermath, the development of huge business corporations about 100 years ago, World War I, the New Deal, World War II, the Cold War, and the Great Society/Civil Rights period of the 1960s. This trend has continued despite efforts by some recent political leaders (President Reagan, Republican Congressional leadership following the 1994 election, and initially President G. W. Bush [but the post-September 11 “War on Terror,” the recent catastrophic hurricanes, and other considerations have pushed more in the national direction]) to reverse it. One major mechanism driving this nationalizing trend is the federal (categorical) grants-in-aid system, i.e., the federal government taxes people and businesses in all states and then grants money back to state and local governments on condition that they do certain things. States sometimes don't like the strings that are attached to such grants, but they are understandably reluctant to turn down the money. (Sometimes Congress even imposes unfunded mandates on the states, i.e., "strings" without money.) In the 1990s, the Republican Congress converted some federal grants-in-aid programs into block grants with fewer (or different) strings attached. (“Welfare reform” was an example.)
The Logic of Nationalization. A clear logic underlies this 200-year trend toward more nationalized politics and public policy. As the American population has become larger, more mobile, and more interdependent (with raw materials, manufactured goods, workers, businesses, investment, information services, pollution, etc., moving around the continent without regard to state boundaries), states are increasingly confronted with social coordination and social dilemma problems (of the kinds discussed in Kernell and Jacobson Chapter 1) that can be resolved most conveniently by federal authority. (Their discussion on pp. 97-100 is especially good in explaining this logic and providing examples.) Note that the same trend is now evident worldwide (part of what comes under the label of “globalization”), confronting national governments with coordination and dilemma problems and leading to the creation of supranational (higher than national) confederal organizations created by multilateral treaties [or “social contracts”] among nations, e.g., the European Union [EU], the World Trade Organization [WTO], the North American Free Trade Area [NAFTA], and prospective supranational organizations to deal with climate change, global warming, and other global public goods problems.