Judging Other Cultures

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Thanks, Max, for an insightful commentary.

>>But I still think that absolute cultural relativism
>>does clash with a human rights stance where
>>coercion is involved.

This is true.  To me the problem is to remain a cultural relativist at base,
yet find a set of principles to establish the limits of cultural relativism,
the point where other considerations should trump it -- but to find this
point in a way that is not simply a product of ethnocentric bias.  Most
people who have thought about this subject much will see that both
ethnocentric judgments and absolute cultural relativism have insurmountable
problems.  Progress on the issue for scholars, philosophers, and women's
rights activists lies in specifying the conditions for a third way.  This
admittedly is not easy to do.  What I see far too much of is a demonstration
of the flaws of absolute relativism, followed by an apparent assumption that
we're now off the hook philosophically and can make whatever ethnocentric
judgment we please.

>>Ultimately, though, the change has to come about
>>from and among the people in that country. And
>>that is happening, from grass-roots educational
>>movements to local and national African
>>governments, so in a way I think this discussion
>>about the cultural values is a little dated,
>>because they are in flux.

I agree completely.

>>What bothers me about the cultural relativist
>>stance is that it declares gender-based issues
>>off-limits as internal affairs, but the
>>relativism seems to dissolve in the face of
>>practices imposed by one ethnic group over another,
>>such as some of the modern survivals of
>>slavery. Then the language of rights is deemed
>>admissable and relevant.

It seems to me that it's easiest to see that objecting to some alien
cultural practice is not merely ethnocentric when those who are the presumed
"victims" of the practice also object.  Victims of genocide typically don't
accept their own demise.  If there is an internal women's rights movement
that is making a case against practices that victimize women, outsiders have
obvious standing to support them.  I would argue, also, that outsiders have
the right to disseminate to insiders information that could lead to
questioning the practice.  Assent that stems from simply not being able to
imagine an alternative is not really assent.

OTOH, take the matter of arranged marriage.  I have frequently witnessed in
my classroom the following scenario:  Anglo-American students assume that
having your marriage arranged for you by somebody else is oppressive.  Many
South Asian students (not all), however, seem genuinely to assent to this
system, and in debate with the Anglo students cite many benefits.  They
argue that the "success rate" is similar in "love" and arranged marriages,
that arrangement circumvents the mistakes you make when your mind is clouded
by infatuation, that not having to "date" leaves them free to concentrate on
studies, etc.  In this case, then, many of the "victims" do not agree that
they are victimized.

>>I for one believe it is possible to support these
>>women and publicize their work, without falling
>>into the errors of cultural arrogance and judgement
>>which have been described so well in some of the
>>works listed in recent posts.

Very well said!

  -- Gina

 I don't see much evidence of feminist tact (or just strategy) displayed
within U.S. society that various listmembers are urging is necessary in
dealing with, say, an African society.

We are all "outsiders" to some segments even of our own society, and yet
there's lots of denunciation and very little relativism evident in feminist
pronouncements about "the U.S."  E.g., in the statements about African
women's cultural practices and what they gain from maintaining traditions
such as "FGM," there is an invitation to understand and respect their
positions.  Yet in the U.S., I seldom see such respect for or even plain
willingness to understand the complexities in discussing women (I won't even
mention men!) who don't support feminist ends and/or means, or who live
lives that don't meet feminist standards.  I agree that we have special
possibilities and even obligations toward our own societies, but this
country is actually more like a continent in its size and diversity.  Why
the double standard?

D.
---------------------------------
daphne.patai  @  spanport.umass.edu

>>Yet in the U.S., I seldom see such respect for or
>>even plain willingness to understand the
>>complexities in discussing women (I won't even
>>mention men!) who don't support feminist ends
>>and/or means, or who live lives that don't meet
>>feminist standards.....Why the double standard?

Well, in response, I can say that in my last post I considered using the
examples of various cosmetic surgeries in the US, or the wearing of shoes
that deform women's feet, as examples of cultural practices "victimizing"
women, to which the victims assent.  I left them out, however, in the
interests of space.

However, I think that while I should support and follow the lead of African
women activists on FGM, in my own country I don't have to wait for somebody
else's lead to say clearly what I think is wrong and why.  I'm thinking
primarily in terms of laws and public policies.  I don't think it is my
business to demand professional training for, say, Amish women.  I don't
think that is holding a double standard.

Cheers.

  -- Gina

I have followed the discussion with much interest. I have been taching for
many years on women in a cross-cultural context. No doubt, there are many
places in the world, the US included, where women's lives are not easy, But
I think we should not only use the "judgement-approach" but consider
"learning from others" as a concept. Here I agree with Carolyn Wright who
wrote that we need to look at women's strengths. And, indeed, everywhere in
the world we find something and someone to learn from. I have come to
believe that such an approach is very constructive in teaching. Barbara Watson

Maria-Barbara Watson-Franke, Ph.D.
Department of Women's Studies
San Diego State University
San Diego, CA 92182
mbwatson  @  mail.sdsu.edu

> This is true.  To me the problem is to remain a cultural relativist at base,
> yet find a set of principles to establish the limits of cultural relativism,
> the point where other considerations should trump it -- but to find this
> point in a way that is not simply a product of ethnocentric bias.

Right.  For what it's worth, such a view would not actually *be* "cultural
relativism" as moral philosophers understand that term.  Rather it would
be a form of what we might call "ethical universalism" that allows a fair
amount of difference and variation in *how* different cultures embody or
pursue basic human values.

The way philosophers use the term, "cultural relativism" is the view that
all morality is SIMPLY relative to one's own culture, so that there is
*no way whatsoever* for ANYONE -- whether they are members of that culture
or not! -- to judge or criticize that culture's practices, unless the
practices are contrary to that culture's own expressed values and
principles.  It's a pretty hardcore view, one that I doubt any members of
this list would really adhere to -- which makes me think that most of
those using the term "cultural relativism" mean it in a somewhat different
way than philosophers do.  And that's fine, but worth clarifying.

Rebecca Whisnant

Oboler, Regina wrote:

> Well, in response, I can say that in my last post I considered using the
> examples of various cosmetic surgeries in the US, or the wearing of shoes
> that deform women's feet, as examples of cultural practices "victimizing"
> women, to which the victims assent.  I left them out, however, in the
> interests of space.
>
> However, I think that while I should support and follow the lead of African
> women activists on FGM, in my own country I don't have to wait for somebody
> else's lead to say clearly what I think is wrong and why.  I'm thinking
> primarily in terms of laws and public policies.  I don't think it is my
> business to demand professional training for, say, Amish women.  I don't
> think that is holding a double standard.


Nobody is making US women undergo cosmetic surgery or uncomfortable
shoes.  Indeed,  they seem seek out such practices individually,
sadly,  perhaps,  at least in part to attain what the FGM'ed women are
(culturally) permanently denied - an augmentation in sexual pleasure.
Considering this really outght to lead Westerners to reconsider thought
experiments like Barbara Bergman's,  which ask whether any even
partially informed person (one sweet night) would voluntarily undergo
such a practice.

jeff bridges <3bridges  @  bellsouth.net>

>>For what it's worth, such a view would not actually
>>*be* "cultural relativism" as moral philosophers
>>understand that term.

I'll appeal to other cultural anthropologists on the list to clarify here:
what does the discipline of cultural anthropology mean by "cultural
relativism"?  We generally say it is a hallmark of the discipline, and that
it means not judging the actions of people in other cultures in terms of the
values of one's own culture, but rather in terms of the values extant in
that culture; trying one's best to see the reasons for specific values in
culture-specific terms, etc.  But that is a pretty broad definition.  Though
I've known some cultural anthropologists prepared to take a pretty extreme
relativist stance, most take a position that is what was referred to earlier
in this discussion as "nuanced cultural relativism."

There is, after all, an entire sub-discipline of applied anthropology, in
which practitioners use anthropological knowledge to make real-world
cultural changes -- something one would hardly do if one believes that the
culture is just fine as it is.  One project that I was very familiar with
during my stay in East Africa was aimed at getting nomadic herders to settle
down and take up farming.  Attached as they were to a nomadic lifestyle,
there was an "objective" problem:  that there just wasn't enough land for a
growing population to keep on being camel nomads.  The people themselves
could see this problem.  A touchstone concept in much of applied
anthropology is "community self-determination" -- the people themselves
figure out and sign on to changes that can work.

>>The way philosophers use the term, "cultural
>>relativism" is the view that all morality is SIMPLY
>>relative to one's own culture, so that there is
>>*no way whatsoever* for ANYONE -- whether they are
>>members of that culture or not! -- to judge or
>>criticize that culture's practices

When I studied philosophy as an undergrad (in the 60s) the term "cultural
relativism" was never used.  What is described here was called "moral
relativism" -- morality is relative to the mores of the time and place.

I still don't understand the notion, though, that there is no way for people
to criticize their own culture's mores -- it seems to me that people have
been doing that since the dawn of time.  What exactly does this mean?  That
there is no way to offer such a criticism and *prove logically* that you are
right?

>>which makes me think that most of those using the
>>term "cultural relativism" mean it in a somewhat
>>different way than philosophers do.  And that's
>>fine, but worth clarifying.

I probably am using it in a different way.  For one thing, I am assuming
that there can be degrees, that one can *be* a cultural relativist and still
acknowledge that the concept has limits.  If there are different
"feminisms," why should there not be different "cultural relativisms"?  As
you are describing "what philosophers mean" by this concept, it seems
possible to me that *nobody* would be a cultural relativist (except maybe
William Graham Sumner who was famous for his dictum "the mores are always
right.")  Yet it's certainly true that most cultural anthropologists I know
would describe themselves as cultural relativists.

Perhaps the philosopher's "cultural relativism" is an example of the social
scientist's "ideal type"?

  -- Gina

wHEN VISITING A feminist NGO in Vilna Lithuania I saw the following poster
on their wall and bought some copies.  It addresses the issue of the
treatment of women because of tradition.
  WE MUST BE COURAGEOUS IN SPEAKING OUT ON THE ISSUES THAT CONCERN US:

wE MUST NOT BEND UNDER THE WEIGHT OF SPURIOUS  ARGUMENTS INVOKING CULTURE
OR TRADITIONAL VALUES.

No value worth the name supports the oppression and enslavement of WOMEN...

iF THEY ARE USED AGAINST US, WE WILL REJECT THEM.

AND MOVE ON.

We will not allow ourselves to be silenced.
Dr. Naftis Sadik, Beijing.

  (I don't know her position since it had to be cut to fit the frame.

Pauline B> Bart pbart  @  ucla.eduh

A rising tide lifts all yachts.
            Professor Lani Guanier
            NWSA Meeting, 2000

"Oboler, Regina" wrote

>I'll appeal to other cultural anthropologists on the list to clarify here:what
does the discipline of cultural anthropology mean by "cultural

> relativism"?  We generally say it is a hallmark of the discipline, and that
> it means not judging the actions of people in other cultures in terms of the
> values of one's own culture, but rather in terms of the values extant in
> that culture; trying one's best to see the reasons for specific values in
> culture-specific terms, etc. --

When anthropologists study a culture, any moral condemnation of its
mores might make such a study difficult, if not impossible
(particularly if the mode of study is participant observation). So
anthropologists have to take a non-condemnatory stance. But the rest
of us, who are not engaged in such study, should see ourselves as
allies of or advocates for the members of those cultures who are
victimized by those mores, if any. That is obvious when the mores
include slavery, and the extreme domination of one group by
another. Most gender issues would come under the latter
classification. FGM is not just a valued rite of passage. Its purpose
is to keep women virgins until marriage, and to reduce marital
infidelity by reducing the pleasure of sexual acts. Therefore, its
major use is to serve men's interests. Wifebeating is another practice
that does.  

Barbara R. Bergmann bbergman  @  wam.umd.edu 
Prof Emerita, Economics, American U and U of Maryland 
5430 41 place nw dc 20015 

barbara watson wrote:

>I agree with Carolyn Wright who
>wrote that we need to look at women's strengths.

...and by way also of a nod toward daphne patai's comment about north america:

in my work in native american studies (i'm european american), i've had to
struggle with this question -- which for me comes down to an analysis of
power (regina and others have been talking about this really)....  i don't
think, for instance, that we can evaluate the degree of "freedom" a woman
had in "choosing" to bind her feet, undergo liposuction, etc, without
looking at the degree of autonomy a given culture grants her.  so wonder if
this might be helpful (i'm pasting here from a work of mine in progress) --

        Writing in 1995 in Women and Power in Native North America (Laura
F. Klein and Lillian A. Ackerman, eds.), Daniel Maltz and JoAllyn
Archambault present a model for evaluating power, which they think proves
that native women did enjoy a pre-invasion equality of sorts.  They
attribute the model to a 1967 essay by Ernestine Friedl, which was then
further developed by Susan Harding in 1975.  It goes like this:  to assess
the level of social power attending a group, you must measure:
        1.  apparent power as determined by ideology and formal institutions,
        2.  real power as determined by indirect influence, and
        3.  the limitations of different types of power based on the
structural relationships between different power domains.

(as for the disciplinary discussion we've been having, maltz and
archambault are anthropologists.)

i have done a very short application (some will find it too short :> but
this is not the *focus* of my work) of this model to european american and
native american women -- if anyone wants to see it by way of illustrating
this model, write me backchannel.  for me the biggest difference between
european and native sex divisions lies in # 3 -- european american women
are permitted "power" over domestic institutions, but the domestic sphere
is not nearly as privileged/valued as, say, *congress*, or the *boardroom*,
etc (and domestic power is easily rescinded if a woman doesn't behave
herself).  in much of native america, with community-based cultures
organized around the notion that survival was/is dependent on everyone
pitching in, there was/is not the severe difference in valuation between
one sphere and another....

native feminist scholars such as oneida meranto have argued that the major
import of colonization was sexism -- and this is where the postcolonial
theorists come into play.  africa is not an area of "specialization" of
mine, but in native america there have been incidences in which a specific
aspect of colonial misogyny has found an easy ideological partner in a
specific aspect of invaded-culture belief.  this leads (historically
speaking) to a quick (one generation or less) loss of autonomy for women in
regard to that specific thing -- and so almost overnight "choice" becomes
(literally) complicated.  the "choice" then is not between undergoing the
cruelty and not undergoing the cruelty, but between acceptance and
alienation.  correct me if i'm wrong -- it's my understanding that this was
the case with clitorectomy:  as defense of a newly power-stripping cruelty,
leaders (male and female, coopted by invaders and seeking power however
they can get it in a new atmosphere in which *cultural* autonomy has been
stripped) can rationalize the cruel practice by calling it both
"traditional" *and* "progress."  so the "choice" is door number one -- or
door number one.

oy.

would it be too radical to argue that arguing about whether women choose
foot-binding is too much like arguing over where the chairs go on the
titanic?  i address this concern to both insiders *and* outsiders -- since
this may be a symbiotic, not oppositional, relationship.  if we aren't
contributing to the restoration/creation of a culture's foundational power
grid -- in a way that answers maltz and archambault's 3 concerns positively
-- we're just addressing symptoms -- aren't we?  (this with all due
concern, yes, absolutely, for the arrogance possible in the term
"positively" -- in this, insiders will check their outsider partners,
certainly.)  without an alteration of the power grid, fewer women may
"choose" foot-binding, but other symptoms may simply...appear elsewhere?

kass fleisher


~~~~~~~~~

kass.fleisher  @  colorado.edu
links to online publications available at:
http://spot.colorado.edu/~fleisher

With Barbara Bergmann, I wonder whether we're paying sufficient
attention to the nature of some of these practices.

We seem to be treating them as all somehow equivalent, but
foot-binding and FGM, for example, are irreversible mutilations.
No matter what else changes in the victim's life, no matter how
she evaluates her loss in terms of social standing, the cold fact
is that she can never recover the abilities such acts take from
her.  We would never try to rationalise the ritualised amputation
of a hand as acceptable (or would we?) -- so why does it seem to
be so hard to condemn other mutilations?

Margaret

--
oneko  @  mindspring.com
--------------------------------------
Il felino pi· piccolo F un capolavoro.
--Leonardo da Vinci

Well, one thing that a cultural anthropologist would *certainly* say is that
one should fully understand a practice in its cultural context before
judging it.  To say that FGM is "for the purpose" of keeping girls virgins
until married and to reduce marital infidelity is really to misunderstand
some of the cultures with this practice.  (I acknowledge that in some
cultures it may have this effect, and also that the reasons why a custom
originated may be lost to the understanding of the people who currently
practice it.)

It is certainly true that FGM mutes sexual sensation, but it does not
eliminate it.  If it's meant to reduce the incidence of marital infidelity,
it doesn't work very well.  In fact a number of societies with clitoral
excision, including the one I worked in, expect and encourage women to be
highly sexual creatures, and to experience orgasm in sexual encounters.

There are plenty of *other* reasons why the practice is harmful, though.  To
argue that it is not always specifically meant to achieve sexual repression
is not to say that it is therefore harmless.  But it's too simplistic to say
that "the reason" this custom exists is to sexually repress women to serve
patriarchal oppression.

In any event, I'm trying to make a case for a procedure that can be applied
to *any* cultural practice.  In my mind, this all isn't about FGM
specifically or whether or not it is a harmful practice.  (I agree that it
is.)

What I am advocating is that we should not make snap ethnocentric judgments
about other people's customs -- whether we are anthropologists or not -- but
rather should reserve judgment until we've made our best effort to
understand the custom and its place in its cultural context fully.  At that
point, we can judge it harmful if it serves no beneficial purpose and if
"objective" observers can all agree that it does real, serious harm.  If the
"victims" of the practice (or at least some of them) are coerced and
perceive themselves to be victims, it makes it easier to render the
judgment, but I do not completely rule out the possibility of such a
judgment even if these conditions are not present.

What I don't understand is why, instead of trying to find a process that
would enable us to condemn practices that are violations of human rights,
while still maintaining the understanding that many cultural practices may
be different (and even appear very negative to members of another culture
who haven't fully understood them in their cultural context) but still
worthy of respect, you would apparently rather be free to make snap
ethnocentric judgments.

I think I've said about everything I have to say on this, and fully expect
Joan to stop the thread soon anyway.  So have the last word, with my
compliments.

  -- Gina