Reaching Beyond the State: Judicial Independence, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and Accountability in Guatemala

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In this paper, we examine the role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its efforts to impose accountability for human rights violations in Latin America. We suggest that, because domestic enforcement mechanisms are irreconcilably deficient in this task, accountability must emanate from beyond the state. We test this contention by examining one of the most challenging nations in the region — Guatemala.

Introduction

Guatemalan security forces killed an estimated two hundred thousand people during that country’s thirty-year internal conflict. Most of those responsible for these crimes remain hidden behind a stubborn wall of impunity. In one episode, on July 18, 1982, Guatemalan military and paramilitary personnel slaughtered 268 civilians. The massacre took place in Plan de Sanchez and surrounding communities where “soldiers randomly picked their victims, raping and torturing young women before rounding up villagers in a house, throwing in hand grenades and firing machines guns” (Guatemalan Human Rights Commission 2004). Most of the 268 victims were Mayan. For more than twenty years Guatemala blocked all attempts to punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the Plan de Sanchez massacre.

As nations work to democratize and to liberalize after periods of intense conflict, how can they confront their history of brutal human rights atrocities? How can their recurrence be prevented? While traditional Anglo-American democratic theory suggests that an independent judiciary is the institution ideally suited to hold the government accountable to the law, in this essay we will consider whether international courts are necessary to help

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postconflict nations confront their past and democratize. By looking at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), we examine whether international courts can effectively promote human rights accountability and protection, and if so to what extent. Human rights scholarship is perhaps at its most revealing when the analysis is coupled with the human story from which the legal and political issues arise. Therefore, our analysis will orbit around the case studies of the Mack, Carpio and Plan de Sanchez trials from Guatemala (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003; Carpio v. Guatemala 2004; Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004). Guatemala is an ideal subject of analysis for this essay because it is emerging from thirty years of political violence. It has suffered some of the most horrific human rights violations in the region and it is now struggling to reconcile this past and embrace liberal democracy. It has one of the worst human rights records in Latin America according to observers like Amnesty International and the US State Department, and thus it is a monumentally challenging case (Amnesty International 1995–2005; US Department of State 1995–2004).

To uncover answers to our questions we first provide a brief history of Guatemala. We then consider the role of courts in the struggle for human rights, demonstrating the need for international judicial action. Accompanying this section, we include a discussion of the purpose of international courts. Then after a brief introduction to the Inter-American human rights system and our three case studies, we examine whether and how the IACHR accomplishes the purpose of an international human rights tribunal. Finally, drawing on lessons from the analysis, we conclude that international courts, and specifically the Inter-American Court, can indeed promote human rights. We base our analysis on interviews with lawyers and activists working in the area, on our observation of proceedings before the IACHR, and on the content analysis of IACHR decisions.

**Historical Background**

Guatemala has a deeply tragic history of political violence and widespread human rights violations with causes traceable to its colonial roots. In an effort to break with years of repression, stratification, and exploitation of colonial and postcolonial regimes, Guatemala elected populist presidents in the two elections following World War II. Dr. Juan José Arévalo and his successor Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman embraced land reform and encouraged broader political participation. However, in 1954, when President Arbenz’s reform efforts were perceived as harming US interests, the Central Intelligence Agency helped Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas overthrow Arbenz. In order to consolidate power and to reverse the political opening of the Arévalo and Arbenz regimes, the Armas government strengthened the state security apparatus extending it to the rural areas. For more than forty years this security apparatus has been brutally repressing opposition in whatever form it appeared—supporters of land reform, the labor movement, and the rural insurgency. In 1978 when General Romeo Lucas Garcia became president he first targeted political opposition in the urban centers and later the labor movement and insurgency in the countryside. Then after taking power in a coup in 1982 General Efrain Rios Montt launched a bloody scorched earth anti-insurgency campaign. Most of the male peasants were conscripted into civil patrols and tens of thousands of innocent Guatemalans and combatants were killed (Ropp and Sikkink 2003).

In 1983, General Oscar Mejia Victores overthrew Rios Montt and began a painstakingly slow process of democratization. However, this promising step did not coincide with the cessation of violence as the military continued its bloody anti-insurgency campaign. Despite
a relatively successful democratic power transition in 1986 the civilian governments were unable to wrest meaningful authority from the military (Ropp and Sikkink 2003).

Serrano Elias was elected president of Guatemala in 1990 defeating the National Center Party led by Jorge Carpio Nicolle. However, Serrano’s legislative coalition dissolved in 1993 causing him to lose control of his legislative agenda. On May 25, 1993, Serrano executed a “self-coup” in which he dismissed Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Procurator of Human Rights. He suspended fundamental liberties and took control of radio and television broadcasting (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). On June 1, 1993, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court declared Serrano’s administration illegal and Serrano fled to El Salvador amidst rising opposition. Five days later the Congress appointed the Procurator of Human Rights, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, Jorge Carpio Nicolle’s cousin, President of Guatemala (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). Serrano’s coup signaled the first albeit small step away from military dominance. Alvaro Arzú was elected president in 1996 and the Guatemalan Peace Accords were signed that year.

Even with the Peace Accords and the transition to democratically elected civilian governments, Guatemalans continued to suffer brutal human rights violations. When the war ended in 1996, the Peace Accords required Guatemala to reform its justice system. However, the United Nations agency established to monitor compliance with the peace accords (United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala [MINUGUA]) reported continued impunity and the persistent lack of due process. In its 2000 Special Report, MINUGUA concluded that “[w]ith regard to the allegations of threats, harassment and intimidation of judges, the Special Rapporteur finds that these concerns are real [and that t]he Government ha[s] failed to provide the requisite protection or assistance to those who have complained” (MINUGUA 2000: 30). In addition, “the large number of unsolved violent murders and the high incidence of impediments to investigations and prosecutions in these murders and human rights-related crimes . . . should give an indication of the very high rate of impunity” (MINUGUA 2000: 31). The MINUGUA report in 2001 states that “[h]arassment and threats to justice operators continue to be of serious concern [and that] rather than declining, these incidents have actually increased” (MINUGUA 2001; 24). This report finds that “impunity is still widespread” (MINUGUA 2001: 24). In 2004, Óscar Berger was sworn in as Guatemala’s latest president. President Berger emphasized improving Guatemala’s human rights protections as a central feature of his campaign. As we discuss below, the Berger administration has taken some steps to fulfill that promise. However, there are still monumental obstacles to improving human rights conditions and to achieving justice for human rights violations.

The Role of Courts

Legal Accountability

In the face of the legacy of catastrophic political violence, victims frequently look to the courts to reconstruct the rule of law and to provide justice. According to many human rights activists and scholars, courts must act to consolidate democratic reform based upon the rule of law in postconflict or postauthoritarian settings (Siedler 1996; Kritz 1997; Dodson and Jackson 2001). As Fletcher and Weinstein argue, “Accountability provides a direct, moral, and ethical response to victims on behalf of society that demonstrates that the state is validating their innocence and their lack of culpability in the deeds” (Fletcher and Weinstein
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2002: 590). By punishing those responsible, the state recognizes the suffering of the victims and issues a moral condemnation of the actions committed (Minow 1998). As Jamie Mayerfeld writes, punishment “communicates society’s condemnation of [the] violation, and helps actual and potential aggressors to absorb the lesson that such violation is morally wrong” (Mayerfeld 2002: 100). Courts address the victims’ desire for retribution by punishing individual defendants and in so doing may also serve to protect against future violations (Mertus 1999). Mayerfeld argues that “the obligation to deter constitutes the core rationale for punishing human rights violations” (Mayerfeld 2002: 99). Yet another scholar, Jennifer Widner, points out that by punishing violators, courts can provide a credible threat that future violations will be punished as well (Widner 1998). In order to guarantee human rights in the present, past threats to punish must be carried out (Widener 1998; Mayerfield 2002).

Indeed, according to Mayerfeld, effective judicial dispute resolution systems “encourage social reconciliation by modeling a fair procedure for the just disposition of violent conflicts fueled by bitter political and ideological divisions” (Mayerfeld 2002: 100). Judicial action against human rights violators may also prevent future abuses by reestablishing norms such as respect for the rule of law and basic human rights (Malamud-Goti 1990; Roht-Arriaza 1995). Ruti Teitel states that “[w]hen criminal justice denounces these crimes, such prosecutions have a systemic impact transcending the implicated individual . . . [and to] society, such trials express the normative value of equality under the law, a threshold value in the transformation to liberal democratic systems” (Teitel 1997: 2047–2048). Teitel also argues that “establishing knowledge of past actions committed under color of law and its public construction as wrongdoing is the necessary threshold to prospective normative uses of the criminal law” (Teitel 1997: 2050–2051). Martha Minow agrees with this assertion as she writes, “To respond to mass atrocity with legal prosecutions is to embrace the rule of law” (Minow 1998: 25). Human rights trials, according to Minow, transform individual desires for vengeance to the state and this “transfer cools vengeance into retribution, slows judgment with procedure and interrupts, with documents, cross-examinations and the presumption of innocence, the vicious cycle of blame and feud” (Minow 1998: 26; Widner 1998).

Judicial Independence and Accountability

Scholars and activists frequently urge judicial independence and reform in order to establish a domestic institution capable of holding government accountable to the rule of law (Prilliman 2000). The result, in theory, is an independent court system at home that can check tyranny from the other political institutions. Judicial independence can be defined as the extent to which the members of a court may adjudicate free from institutional controls, incentives, and impediments imposed by other political institutions or forces (Becker 1970). In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton states that “the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order to, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority” (Hamilton et al. 1961: 457). According to Hamilton, the independence of the judiciary operates as a “safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society” (Hamilton et al. 1961: 470). As Charles Epp states in his comparative study, “the judicial system’s structural independence . . . is widely recognized as a necessary condition for any significant judicial check on arbitrary power” (Epp 1998: 11).

Independence would seem to be especially important if courts are to hold government officials accountable for past or ongoing violations of human rights. In a comparison of the United States and Canadian high courts, Miller discovered the US Supreme Court was more likely to challenge other branches because it possessed more autonomy than its Canadian counterpart (Miller 1998). Comparative scholars have consistently recognized
the importance of judicial independence in democratization, protecting individual rights and promoting the rule of law (Epp 1998; Prillman 2000; Russell and O’Brien 2001; Dodson and Jackson 2001). Dodson and Jackson linked the impotence of the judiciary directly to human rights violations in Guatemala and El Salvador (Dodson and Jackson 2001).

Thomas Jefferson differed with Hamilton’s view of judicial independence, however, arguing that judges “should be submitted to some practical and impartial control” (Jefferson 1903: 121). He observed that “[a]ll know the influence of interest on the mind of man, and how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence” (Jefferson 1903: 121). Critics of absolute judicial autonomy “object to what they consider to be an inordinate and constitutionally unjustifiable grant of power to the branch of government which is least likely to accurately represent the genuine will of the people” (Pak 1999: 237). For example, Mark Tushnet argues that granting judges independence encourages them to follow their political will and not necessarily their legal judgment (Tushnet 1988: 1669). Michael Collins points out that an independent court “could itself engage in acts of constitutional usurpation that might be difficult to remedy” (Collins 2004: 675, 676).

It is possible, then, that the traditional pillars of judicial independence could, in some circumstances, impede human rights accountability. Ratner and Abrams argue that, “Accountability cannot be isolated from the political dynamic in which competing factions within states seek to manipulate the past in order to justify both their prior activities and the current programs” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 157). In repressive states, judges abetting tyranny could continue to do so unencumbered by the constraints of democratic accountability. Independence can only free courts from unwanted influence, it cannot grant judges the will to confront decades of impunity, nor can it anoint them with the wisdom to overcome legislatively or constitutionally rooted opposition to accountability. Judges will, after all, always be bound to the political elite at least to some degree and as Ratner and Abrams articulate, “the most critical reason for the lack of prosecutions . . . is that serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law are usually committed on behalf of or with the complicity of the state” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 183). In addition to judicial ties to state actors, the barriers maintaining impunity include doctrines of sovereign immunity and amnesty laws, both of which are raised and maintained by the state.

In new and unstable democracies the prosecution of human rights cases can actually destabilize the democratic government and harm the cause of accountability. Ratner and Abrams point out that “if a nation’s leaders allow the prosecutions to become a pawn in the competition for power, the trials will lack credibility and damage the foundations of democracy” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 183). These authors cite the Argentine experience, in which the prosecution of human rights cases motivated the military “to challenge the young and insecure civilian government, thereby putting an end to the prosecutorial process.” Similar dangers exist in Guatemala. On the other hand Ratner and Abrams recognize that “outside actors—states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—can often help strengthen regimes seeking accountability and defuse threats from the opponents of prosecutions” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 183).

To summarize, judicial independence allows courts to provide some measure of accountability for human rights violations. However, because domestic courts are part of the state, they are constrained by state-constructed barriers. The level of accountability they can provide, therefore, is severely limited. To overcome these barriers and to reach greater levels of accountability victims must reach beyond the state. As we will demonstrate further below, doing so not only affords victims with a forum beyond state control, it can strengthen the independence of local judicial processes.
Deep Wounds and Shallow Justice—Domestic Prosecutions in the Carpio, Plan de Sanchez, and Mack Cases

In the spring of 1993, politician, reform activist and newspaper-owner Jorge Carpio Nicolle opposed the Serrano self-coup and the subsequent proposals to grant amnesty to those who orchestrated the coup. Within a month of this outspoken opposition, a state-sponsored civil patrol intercepted and murdered Carpio and several of his associates (Ratner and Abrams 2001). The families sought justice for the killings in Guatemala but judge after judge refused to hear the case. Guatemalan trial and appellate courts twisted the law to block all efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the killings (Davis 2006). Throughout the more than ten years of investigation numerous crucial pieces of evidence have been lost, mislabeled, and otherwise destroyed (Davis 2006). Despite a report prepared by a chief prosecutor implicating eleven members of a civil defense patrol in the murders, only four of these men were tried and only one was convicted of the crime, Juan Acabal Patzan. Moreover, this conviction came in 1996 after three years of dilatory tactics by the defense and by the trial courts. In an additional blow, the trial court refused to consider the role of the civil defense patrol and foreclosed any investigation into the intellectual authors of the attack. Then in 1998, in a shocking ruling, the Guatemalan Court of Appeals absolved Patzan of any responsibility for the murder and ordered his immediate release. The Court cited numerous evidentiary irregularities, including the broken chain of custody of the alleged murder weapon. The Guatemalan Supreme Court upheld this result and, while the investigation remains open, no notable progress has occurred since that time (Davis 2006).

The result utterly destroyed any belief the families had that Guatemala would provide them with justice in the case. As the wife of one of the victims, Silvia Villacorta, testified before the Inter-American Court, “Guatemala is a country of deep wounds and shallow justice” (Arrivillaga de Carpio 2004). The wife of Jorge Carpio, Mrs. Arrivillaga de Carpio, recounted the utter failure of the justice system in Guatemala and told the Inter-American Court that, as a result, she lived each day in fear (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). “I felt unprotected,” she testified (Arrivillaga de Carpio 2004).

The state obstructed all efforts to pursue truth and justice in the Plan de Sanchez massacre case as well. During the period in which the massacre occurred (1982), the military was terrorizing the Mayan peasant countryside as part of its scorched earth counterinsurgency campaign. These onslaughts came in the form of murders, violent intimidation, displacement, and the destruction of houses, farms, and livestock. Thus, in the decade that followed the 1982 massacre the state was almost completely successful in blocking attempts to investigate those responsible. One of the victims, Juan Manual Jerónimo, testified, “The first years after the massacre we didn’t do anything to seek justice because we were not even allowed to talk about what happened never mind what we wanted to do (Plan de Sanchez 2004: para.38). Finally, in 1993 victims represented by the Center for Human Rights Legal Action (CALDH) brought charges. After exhumations and an investigation began in 1994 the process quickly ran into state-erected road blocks. Evidence, such as ammunition cartridges and ballistics reports disappeared and exhumations slowed to a stop. As one of the victims, Buenaventura Manuel Jerónimo, testified before the Inter-American Court:

After a long time, a report of the incident was filed by the Center for Human Rights Legal Action [In Guatemala]. Nevertheless, until today there has been neither justice nor any results of that process. The violence, the corruption, and the discrimination against the indigenous peoples and farmers impede justice.
Until this day there are still threats against any judge involved in the case. (Plan de Sanchez 2004, para.38)

On September 11, 1990, Myrna Mack Chang, an anthropologist studying the displacement of thousands of indigenous Guatemalans, was assassinated by members of a military death squad. Authorities originally informed Myrna Mack’s sister, Helen, that Myrna perished in an auto accident. Skeptical of the claim, Helen eventually discovered the true cause of her sister’s death — she had been stabbed twenty-seven times outside her Guatemala City office. For Helen Mack, the path to justice has been an insufferable ordeal. The state actively blocked her efforts to hold those responsible for the murder accountable under Guatemalan law. As in the Carpio and Plan de Sanchez cases the mechanisms of impunity were first deployed during the initial investigation. Investigators neglected to take fingerprints, photographs, or blood samples from the crime scene. Although Myrna Mack’s clothing and fingernail samples were initially retained, they were discarded before any laboratory analysis was conducted on them. A report drafted by investigators suggesting that Guatemalan security forces planned and carried out the murder was destroyed. When one of these investigators testified about this report he was assassinated (Baluarte and Chlopak 2003).

In addition to legal and procedural obstructions those wishing to preserve impunity launched a violent campaign against anyone working on the Mack case. In April 1994 the president of Guatemala’s Constitutional Court, Epaminondas González Dubón, was shot and killed. At the time of the murder the Court was considering several controversial human rights cases, including preliminary rulings on the Myrna Mack case (Human Rights First 2003). Throughout the more than ten years of judicial proceedings death threats have driven more than ten judges to drop the case. Several judges, prosecutors, and witnesses have fled the country after receiving death threats. In July 1994, Helen Mack was forced to leave Guatemala after a plan to murder her was exposed. The next month Roberto Romero, a Myrna Mack Foundation lawyer, fled the country after assailants fired at him (Human Rights Watch 1995; Human Rights First 2003). In an interview, an activist working in Guatemala reported that she has personal knowledge of judges and prosecutors who suffer “harassment, threats [and] in a lot of cases their families have been threatened, they’re harassed, some of them have suffered attacks and some have suffered pressure from within the system” (A. Beltran 2004: pers. comm., June 4).

The Need for International Court Involvement

Both Governmental agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) monitoring the judiciary in Guatemala during and after the war have unanimously found that Guatemala’s courts not only failed to offer citizens adequate judicial remedies but actually aided human rights violations and perpetrated impunity. For example, The Historical Clarification Commission for Guatemala concluded: “The justice system, non-existent in large areas of the country before the armed confrontation, was further weakened when the judicial branch submitted to the requirements of the dominant national security model.” The Historical Clarification Commission went even further finding that:

...by tolerating or participating directly in impunity, which concealed the most fundamental violations of human rights, the judiciary became functionally inoperative with respect to its role of protecting the individual from the State,
and lost all credibility as guarantor of an effective legal system. This allowed impunity to become one of the most important mechanisms for generating and maintaining a climate of terror. (Guatemala Historical Clarification Commission Report 1998)

Even after the Peace Accords were signed in 1996 justice was simply not available to human rights victims. Few cases were prosecuted and the intimidation of complainants, judges, prosecutors, and witnesses obstructed the judicial process. With the Mack, Carpio, and Plan de Sanchez cases we see a fundamental justification for international courts. When a domestic system so completely fails in its duty to uphold the rule of law, it is incumbent on the international system to fill the void. According to Teitel, international human rights “jurisprudence evinces the clear delimiting of state power on the basis of individual rights norms” (Teitel 1997: 2054). Extranational rulings against former officials shatter the view that these officials are immune from prosecution and inspire local attempts to penetrate the shield of impunity. Prosecutions in international courts, therefore, can send a powerful message to the legal and human rights communities in postconflict nations. Ratner and Abrams point out that international courts can “put pressure on governments to comply with their international obligations (including their duties to prosecute offenders)” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 226). They also recognize that these institutions can “establish an authoritative factual record” and “serve the cause of developing human rights and humanitarian law” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 226). Minow argues that when a crime against humanity is “prosecuted outside the affected territory, in the absence of regime change, it is perhaps the purest illustration of the potential of law to effect normative transition . . . [i]ndeed, the very response to the crime against humanity instantiates its core value of transcendent justice” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 226). Extranational convictions can aid local prosecutions by communicating legal strategies and even precedent through the embracing of a broad concept of international law. As Minow observes “[e]specially when framed in terms of universality, the language of rights and the vision of trials following their violation equip people to call for accountability even where it is not achievable” (Minow 1998: 48).

Cases Before the IACHR

Introduction to the Inter-American System

The Organization of American States (OAS) established the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) in 1959 to monitor compliance with the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Then in 1965, the OAS gave the Commission the power to hear individual human rights cases and recommend solutions. In 1969 the OAS recast its human rights principles by adopting the American Convention on Human Rights. The Convention not only sets out the basic human rights standards for member states but it establishes the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). Of the thirty-five OAS member nations twenty-four have accepted the binding jurisdiction of the IACHR (Pasqualucci 2003). Guatemala signed the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights on May 25, 1978, and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on March 9, 1987.

Under the Convention the primary functions of the Commission are to consider individual complaints and impose conciliatory remedies, to monitor human rights compliance in the region, to conduct on site studies of human rights conditions, and to impose “precautionary measures” to prevent potential human rights violations. The Commission has
frequently involved itself in Guatemala’s human rights affairs. For example after an on-site visit in 2001, the Commission concluded that:

...profound systemic deficiencies continue to subvert justice, and have yet to be effectively addressed. These include serious problems in the systems and procedures for delivering justice, as well as the paralyzing effect of attempts to coerce those involved in the pursuit and administration of justice through threats and corruption. Given the central role of the judiciary in safeguarding all individual rights, the challenge of redressing these problems is both urgent and paramount. (Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala 2001)

To pursue a human rights claim in the Inter-American system victims or their representatives must first file a complaint with the Commission. The Commission then seeks a response from the nation alleged to have committed the violation. Once a response is received, the Commission must decide if the case is admissible—meaning within the Commission’s jurisdiction. For the petition to be admissible it must allege violations of rights protected by one of the several instruments recognized by the OAS, and it must demonstrate that the petitioners exhausted their domestic remedies (Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights n.d.). The Commission can hear complaints against any member nation of the OAS (Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights n.d.).

If the Commission determines a case is admissible it considers evidence presented by each of the parties and frequently encourages a negotiated settlement. If negotiations fail the Commission issues a ruling on culpability. If it finds the nation culpable, it issues recommendations and prescribes remedies. These rulings are confidential at this stage and designed to encourage violating nations to comply with the mandated human rights instruments. If a nation fails to comply with the orders of the Commission, the Commission brings the case before the IACHR. Here the Commission prosecutes the case against the nation in question. Evidence is presented and a formal decision is issued by the court that contains a ruling on culpability as well as remedies, if appropriate. The victims may be represented by counsel before the Commission and IACHR.

The Carpio Case

With all efforts to pursue justice at home blocked, Carpio’s wife, Martha Arrivillaga de Carpio, and daughter-in-law, Karen Fischer, looked beyond Guatemala to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. With the help of the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala, the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), Human Rights Watch, and the International Human Rights Law Group, these women filed a petition with the Commission on July 12, 1994. Instead of pleading that they had exhausted local remedies the Carpio petitioners argued that the state actively obstructed their attempts to seek justice domestically and that domestic remedies were therefore unobtainable (Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights n.d.). The Commission agreed that justice in Guatemala had been completely obstructed by the state.

The Commission typically makes the decision on admissibility at the outset—as it did in the Plan de Sanchez case discussed below. However, if more information is needed to make the determination—as it was in the Carpio case—the Commission can reserve this
decision until it has heard from the parties and considered the facts. At this early stage the
Commission sets out to find a conciliatory solution by receiving evidence and negotiating
with the parties. After doing so in the Carpio case, the Commission finally ruled that the case
was admissible. It then ordered Guatemala to investigate the murders thoroughly in order
to punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the attack (Carpio v. Guatemala
2004). The Commission’s order also included provisions recommending reparations for the
families of the victims (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). On June 10, 2003, when Guatemala
failed to reply within the time required, the Commission took the case to the Inter-American
Court (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). It alleged that Guatemala violated the victims’ rights
to life, personal integrity, judicial protection, freedom of expression, and the rights of the
child under the Inter-American Convention. While the Commission prosecuted cases, recent
changes in the IACHR’s rules allow the victims and survivors to be represented by counsel
at the proceedings as well. CEJIL represented the victims and families before the Court
(Carpio v. Guatemala 2004).

As the Carpio hearing began on July 5 and 6, 2004, the president of the Guatemalan
Presidential Commission of Human Rights announced that his government accepted
Guatemala’s international responsibility for the attack on Carpio and his associates (Davis
2004). Guatemala acknowledged that Mr. Carpio was murdered to chill opposition to the
amnesty provisions. Because the state accepted responsibility, neither the Commission
nor CEJIL were required to prove the elements of each of the alleged violations. How-
ever, CEJIL stressed the importance of allowing the victims and families to tell their stor-
ies in open court and the state voiced no opposition to allowing them to do so (Davis
2004).

The Court ruled that the state, acting through paramilitaries, murdered Carpio for
political reasons and that it erected obstructions to justice resulting in “total impunity”
(Carpio v. Guatemala 2004: paras.77–78). It went beyond a simple judgment that Carpio’s
rights were violated and ruled that the rights of all those threatened and attacked in their
pursuit of justice in the case were also violated (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). The reparations
assigned by the Court in both cases reflect a desire to extend beyond compensation and to
take steps to remedy conditions in Guatemala. For example, in addition to money damages
totaling $1,360,000 for the victims’ families, the Court ordered the state to enact concrete
measures to prevent similar violations and continued impunity (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004).

The Plan de Sanchez Case

Blocked by the same infrastructure of impunity in Guatemala, the victims of the Plan de
Sanchez massacre filed their claim with the Inter-American Commission on May 11, 1999.
As in the Carpio case, the petitioners argued and the Commission agreed that local remedies
were unobtainable due to the wall of impunity erected by the state. CALDH represented
the victims and families before the Commission and before the IACHR.

In August, 2000, President Alfonso Portillo admitted “institutional responsibility” for
the Plan de Sanchez massacre during conciliation discussions between the state, the peti-
tioners, and the Commission (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004: para.84). On February
28, 2002, the Commission, after analyzing the positions of both sides, made a series of
recommendations to the state including a demand that the state conduct an investigation to
identify and to sanction those responsible for the massacre (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala
2004). The Commission also required Guatemala to pay both material and nonmaterial
compensation to the survivors of the massacre and to take measures to ensure that such
an atrocity would never recur. Despite Portillo’s acceptance of responsibility, Guatemala failed to take the steps required by the Commission (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004).

Therefore, the Commission presented the case before the IACHR on July 31, 2002. At this stage Commission lawyers took on new roles and prosecuted the case against the state before the Inter-American Court. They alleged that the state of Guatemala violated the rights to personal integrity, judicial protection, judicial guarantees, equality before the law, property, and freedom of religion embodied in Articles 5, 8, 25, 24, 12, 21, and 1.1 of the American Convention of Human Rights (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004). In addition to prosecuting the rights of those killed and wounded during the attacks and the rights of those who suffered losses, the Commission alleged violations based on Guatemala’s resistance to truth and justice in the case.

The Plan de Sanchez hearing took place before the IACHR in San Jose, Costa Rica, on April 23 and 24, 2004. In addition to depositions and affidavits, the Commission and CALDH called family members of those killed in the massacre and experts on the effects of the attack. After the Commission concluded its case, Guatemala announced that it was retracting its exceptions to the complaint and accepting full international responsibility for the massacre and subsequent violations (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004). Doing so constituted complete acceptance of the Commission’s complaint and an admission that Guatemala committed the violations therein alleged. The Court accepted Guatemala’s admissions and shifted the proceeding to the reparations phase (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004).

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the Plan de Sanchez victims were denied their rights to personal integrity, judicial protection, equality before the law, freedom of religion, and property (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004). Moreover the state’s efforts to preserve impunity after the massacre violated the petitioners’ rights to judicial protection (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004). The Court awarded $20,000 per beneficiary in pecuniary damages totaling almost $7 million (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004). Further, the Court ordered Guatemala to construct health care and mental health facilities in the Plan de Sanchez community as well as road, water, and sewer systems (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004).

The Myrna Mack Case

Immediately after Myrna Mack’s murder Helen Mack approached the Inter-American Commission. On Helen’s behalf the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission filed a complaint against Guatemala in the Commission on September 12, 1990. The Commission reserved its determination of admissibility while it observed the domestic process. However, on March 5, 1996, after seeing the ineffectiveness of the domestic proceedings, the Commission ruled that the Mack case was admissible. At a hearing before the Commission the state accepted institutional responsibility for the extrajudicial killing of Myrna Mack. This step facilitated a compromise agreement on the remedies to be prescribed. In this agreement, Guatemala promised to reinitiate the domestic case against the alleged intellectual authors of the killing and to protect the integrity of those proceedings (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003).

The Inter-American Commission sent a delegation to Guatemala to ensure the state complied with the agreement and in two separate reports the delegation found that Guatemala failed to do so. In light of these findings, on March 8, 2001, the Commission issued a decision finding Guatemala responsible for violating Myrna Mack’s right to life and Helen Mack’s right to justice. It assessed damages and required Guatemala to investigate and to prosecute those responsible for orchestrating the murder. In response Guatemala revoked its admission
of institutional responsibility. The Commission ruled that Guatemala showed no indication that it would follow the Commission’s recommendations and filed the case in the IACHR on July 26, 2001. Guatemala objected, arguing that neither the Commission nor the Court had jurisdiction because the domestic prosecution was ongoing. The IACHR agreed with the Commission’s ruling that the domestic prosecution was a façade disrupted by obstructions orchestrated by the state (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003).

The IACHR heard the Mack case from February 18 – 20, 2003. CEJIL represented the victims and along with the Commission they put on evidence of the state’s responsibility for the murder, the repeated state efforts to obstruct the domestic proceedings, and the tremendous toll Myrna Mack’s death had upon the lives of her family members. Myrna Mack’s daughter, who was sixteen years old when her mother was killed, testified that she “thinks of her mother every day, especially of the way she was murdered, of the pain of the 27 knife wounds she suffered, and of how she must have felt lying alone on the street” (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003: para.127).

On November 25, 2003, the Court issued its judgment in which it ruled that the Presidential General Staff had ordered Guatemalan security forces to murder Myrna Mack and that this murder violated the right to life protected in the American Convention (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003). The IACHR ruled that the murder was planned and executed for political purposes as part of a campaign to silence those who would expose Guatemalan human rights violations (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003). The Court also found that Guatemala had denied the Mack family the right to justice by covering up the crime and obstructing the judicial process through legal and violent means (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003). Finally, the Court ruled that Guatemala violated the Mack family’s rights to humane treatment by committing the murder and by using threats and coercion to impede the family’s attempts to pursue justice (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003). In addition to more than $600,000 in pecuniary damages divide among three family members, the Court required Guatemala to remove all obstacles to the domestic prosecution, to name a street after Myrna Mack, and to create a permanent anthropology scholarship in Myrna Mack’s name.

These three cases present a typical formula for Guatemala. In each the state orchestrated a brutal human rights violation. In each the state deployed a multifaceted campaign to cover up the crime and to obstruct all efforts to attain justice. And in each the litigants reached beyond the state, to the Inter-American Court, to escape the Guatemalan formula of injustice.

The IACHR and Human Rights Accountability

The Function of the IACHR

In their study of international courts, Posner and Yoo argue that the IACHR is ineffective because it hears few cases and compliance rates are low (Posner and Yoo 2005). In their effort to compare a wide variety of international courts, these authors necessarily simplify their criteria for effectiveness by concentrating on the number of cases heard and the rate of compliance. This assessment may not fully reflect the effectiveness of an institution like the IACHR. For example, when comparing the IACHR to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Posner and Yoo find the IACHR to be less effective. However, these institutions are in completely different political universes, serving radically different purposes. The ECHR is the pinnacle tribunal created and supported by predominantly established democracies. While it considers cases from transitional democracies, some of which are dealing with political violence, most of its rulings address nonviolent violations.
Table 1
Standard for assessing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of International Court</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Contribution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating Accountability—Equipping Victims to Seek Justice</td>
<td>Minow Roht-Arriaza</td>
<td>Circumventing institutional barriers to accountability Innovating international human rights law Protecting litigants, victims, and witnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemning Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>Minow Mayerfeld Widner Roht-Arriaza</td>
<td>Holding states accountable for violations Communicating societal condemnation of the violations Upholding the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing a Broad Class of Victims with Individual Cases</td>
<td>Teitel Minow</td>
<td>Hearing cases that are emblematic of widespread violations Tailoring remedies to address systemic problems Issuing sanctions to aid broad class of victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a Historical Record</td>
<td>Teitel Minow Ratner and Abrams</td>
<td>Allowing victims to testify often for the first time Recording events based on evidence Overcoming state denials and obfuscations Enshrining the truth in the Court’s judgments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ECHR, and European courts in general, have comparatively high levels of legitimacy (Caldeira and Gibson 1995, 1997). Importantly, the European Union provides significant material incentives to submit to and to comply with the authority of the ECHR. In this environment the goal of the ECHR is to constrain member states under the conventions—member states that for the most part have established records of compliance with the rule of law. On the other hand, the IACHR is an institution striving to solidify its institutional legitimacy in a sea of new and developing democracies. Many of these democracies are experiencing or emerging from drastic political violence. The cases before the IACHR often arise from the political violence that preceded democratization or that is part of the transition struggle. The purpose and setting of the IACHR is fundamentally different, therefore, than that of the ECHR.

In this piece we focus our assessment on whether the IACHR improves human rights conditions in the Americas, concentrating on one of the toughest challenges—Guatemala. Drawing from the scholarship discussed above we identify four purposes of an international court that hears human rights cases from postconflict democracies. (See Table 1.) First, it should operate to deter future violations with rulings that “equip people to call for accountability” (Minow 1998: 48). Second, it should facilitate the legal and moral condemnation of human rights violations (Mayerfeld 2002). Third, its jurisprudence should transcend the parties in the case in order to express the normative value of justice and equality under the
law to broad classes of victims (Minow 1998). Fourth, it should establish “knowledge of past actions committed under color of law” and create a historical record (Teitel 1997: 2050, 2051). An overview of the IACHR’s jurisprudence demonstrates that, given the tribunal’s authority and resources, it has had some success.

Facilitating Accountability—Equipping Victims to Seek Justice

There are numerous examples of the IACHR overriding state efforts to erect institutional barriers to human rights accountability. In 2001, the IACHR ruled that Peruvian amnesty laws protecting military personnel from prosecution for a 1991 massacre violated the American Convention on Human Rights (US Department of State 2002). After this decision the Peruvian government filed charges against security forces allegedly responsible for this and other human rights crimes (US Department of State 2002). In 1999, the IACHR ruled that El Salvador was responsible for the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests and two others. In doing so, the Court struck down El Salvador’s amnesty law, holding that the state had unlawfully denied citizens the right to justice by granting amnesty to those convicted for the murder (US Department of State 2000). Pursuant to IACHR decisions, Chilean courts ruled that a 1978 amnesty law could not supersede international law. Because Chile had ratified the Inter-American treaties prohibiting torture and other human rights violations, the amnesty law as applied to these crimes violated Chile’s international obligations (Human Rights Watch 1995). By circumventing these barriers to accountability, the IACHR equips litigants with the legal tools to pursue justice domestically. These rulings poke holes in the wall of impunity erected by the state.

The most illustrative example of this phenomenon in Guatemala may be the Myrna Mack case—as the IACHR revived the case on at least two occasions. After Myrna Mack was killed by security forces, prosecutors and the Myrna Mack Foundation tried for more than ten years to convict the intellectual authors of the attack. Guatemala had an interest in keeping the domestic case alive in order to preserve its argument that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, and that the Commission case was inadmissible. Then in March, 2000, faced with an imminent IACHR trial, the government offered to take responsibility for the murder. The stalled domestic trial of the senior officers accused in the case suddenly resumed and, armed with IACHR rulings, prosecutors won guilty verdicts against two officers who planned the murder. In another set-back, however, these verdicts were overturned on appeal. Once again the IACHR stepped in. In December, 2003, the IACHR unanimously ruled that Guatemala had violated the right to life and the right to judicial guarantees and protection. The tribunal ordered Guatemala to, among other things, “remove all obstacles to justice in the case” (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003). Just one month later the Guatemalan Supreme Court reinstated the guilty verdicts against the officers who orchestrated Myrna Mack’s murder.

It is clear from the Guatemala cases that the IACHR sees its role as a mechanism to circumvent the systemic impunity in oppressive nations. Throughout the Carpio trial IACHR judges asked witnesses and counsel what the Court could order to remedy impunity, to push human rights cases through the Guatemalan courts, and to prevent future judicial stonewalling (Davis 2004). For example, Judge Garcia Sayan asked several witnesses “what ingredients might be necessary to conduct an effective investigation” in the Carpio case and in similar cases. Judge Jackman asked the lawyers in the case, “What formal steps are needed to reopen the [Carpio] case in Guatemala?” (Davis 2004).

Another way the IACHR helps advocates seek accountability is through the publicity accompanying international cases. Human rights NGOs use the Inter-American process to call attention to the mechanisms fostering impunity domestically. The Washington Office
for Latin America (WOLA) worked with the lawyers in the Mack case to conduct a public relations campaign so that the case would have a significant impact in Guatemala and globally. As Adrianna Beltran, the head of this campaign, stated in an interview, “we used the Mack case as a way of highlighting the inefficiencies of the judicial system” (A. Beltran 2004: pers. comm., June 4). The purpose of the media campaign, according to Ms. Beltran, was to “illustrate[] the impunity that the military enjoyed, the weaknesses and the failures of the judicial system, the human rights situation and the fact that so many witnesses, lawyers, judges were being threatened, harassed, murdered” (A. Beltran 2004: pers. comm., 4 June). Based on the IACHR case, this group orchestrated a campaign to use the case to bring pressure to bear on Guatemala from members of the US government. Ms. Beltran recalled that: “if the [domestic] case was stalling—or if security was necessary—we would organize a campaign involving ‘dear colleague’ letters or remarks on the floor, [we] would then circulate it to U.S. and International media” (A. Beltran 2004: pers. comm., June 4).

As Pasqualucci (2003) observes, the Inter-American Court has liberally settled several controversial questions of international human rights law thereby giving advocates legal tools in their campaign for accountability (Pasqualucci 2003). For example, the Court rejects the contention that rights are “culturally relative” and instead holds them to be universal (IACHR 1982). The IACHR fundamentally altered rights jurisprudence in the region when it held that human rights law was part of international law but that unlike traditional international law, it did not merely grant rights to states (Pasqualucci 2003). Moreover, early in its history, the IACHR held that international law obligated states and granted to individuals the authority to hold states to compliance (Effect of Reservations on Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights 1982). In doing so, the Court struck down state efforts to circumvent this obligation. According to Pasqualucci, the Court allowed fundamental human rights to develop and to expand over time. Instead of interpreting rights as they existed when the Court was established, it considered rights within the legal framework at the time of interpretation (Pasqualucci 2003). Another crucial element of the Court’s jurisprudence, according to Pasqualucci, is that it has held that certain fundamental human rights are nonderogable, even in times of emergency. The Court has refused to allow states to reserve recognition of these fundamental rights (IACHR 1987, 1987).

A CEJIL lawyer, Roxanna Altholz, observed in an interview that the Court is increasingly recognizing impunity and failure to provide justice as distinct human rights violations. Its remedies in the Guatemalan cases are direct attempts to address these violations. IACHR rulings have mandated new and revived prosecutions, and even the reinterpretation of amnesty and limitations laws. Along these lines, Ratner and Abrams note generally that “Certain trends in the international legal process suggest these somewhat vaguely worded provisions are evolving into obligations by states to take specific action against offenders” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 152; citing the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988). According to these scholars, “Among the most significant developments” moving this trend, “was a 1988 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which interpreted the American Convention of Human Rights to require states to investigate seriously, identify and punish offenders as well as compensate victims” (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 152; citing the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988).

The Court also equips victims to seek justice by protecting their safety while they are in litigation. This occurs directly and indirectly. In the direct approach, litigants can ask the IACHR for “provisional measures” if they believe they are in danger or that witnesses are being threatened (American Convention on Human Rights 1969: article 63). The Court will often issue these “provisional measures” ordering, for example, the state to provide armed security to litigants. The indirect element of safety that comes from litigating before
the IACHR arises as a result of the publicity surrounding these cases. Defendants are less likely to attack or to threaten a litigant if they are known internationally. NGOs working within the system foster this. Adrianna Beltran, an activist with WOLA, coordinated the public relations effort during the Mack case. In an interview, she explained that “when [the Mack family’s] lawyer was receiving a number of threats—right before the case actually went to trial—[Helen] called me and said we’re receiving threats and everybody was on the phone with the state department, with the embassy, with members of congress or their staff, saying please call and tell them that you’re really concerned” (A. Beltran 2004: personal comm., June 4). In this effort, Ms. Beltran observed, “we were sending the message that she was not alone” (A. Beltran 2004: personal comm., June 4).

**Condemning Human Rights Violations**

For more than twenty years Guatemala blocked all attempts to punish those responsible for the Plan de Sanchez massacre of 268 Mayan Guatemalans (see above). Then in 2004, the IACHR ruled that Guatemala was responsible not only for the massacre but for denying justice to the victims and families for these many years. In addition to financial compensation, Guatemala was ordered to conduct a public apology. On July 18, 2005, exactly twenty-three years after the massacre, Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo Stein traveled to Plan de Sanchez to formally apologize for the killings before the survivors and families of the victims. In his remarks, Stein conceded that the army had “unleashed bloodshed and fire to wipe out an entire community” (Associated Press 2005). He observed that the “people want moments that commemorate their victims, but more than anything, they don’t want what happened to keep being denied officially” (Associated Press 2005).

The IACHR recognizes the significance of its rulings as the sole voice of justice after years of impunity. In its judgments, therefore, the IACHR goes beyond traditional reparations and includes provisions to amplify the impact of its decisions. Often this takes the form of a mandated, public apology such as the event described above. In one of his first official acts as President, Oscar Berger publicly apologized for the murder of Myrna Mack pursuant to an IACHR demand. President Berger apologized to Myrna Mack’s sister and daughter and to the Guatemalan people in a ceremony broadcast on national television and held in front of the military and other dignitaries.

As the IACHR hearing began in the Carpio case, the president of the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission asked to address the Court. He stood, faced the families of the victims, admitted that the state was responsible for the murder of Carpio and his associates and asked for forgiveness. When each family member testified, counsel for the state opened his remarks by apologizing for the state’s actions (Davis 2004). Soraya Long, the CEJIL lawyer representing the families, commented in an interview that “It is extremely important that the state has recognized its responsibility—this is a very significant step—it is a very important gesture that the state asked for pardon from the victims” (S. Long 2004: personal comm., July 5). Ms. Long explained “For more than ten years the families of the victims have said the murder of my husband, my father, was political—and the state said no, no . . . and now finally they have said you were right, you were right.”

**Addressing a Broad Class of Victims with Individual Cases**

A primary critique of the IACHR levied by Posner and Yoo is that the Court resolves very few cases. While this critique certainly has merit and the IACHR would have a broader effect if it decided more cases, it is a somewhat misleading measure by which to assess
this Court. The IACHR must, after all, preserve its precarious legitimacy in a political sea with currents often hostile to judicial review. If the IACHR were to review large numbers of human rights cases, while many national judiciaries in the region are struggling, support for the institution would almost certainly be withdrawn. Instead the IACHR, and the parties that litigate in the Inter-American system, seek to make the most of the limited resources available to them. For the most part litigants pursue, and the Court decides, cases that reflect a widespread human rights violation or have symbolic importance to the nation and region.

NGOs operating in the Inter-American system seek out cases and victims whose injuries reflect wounds carried by a broader class of victims. CEJIL represents the victims and survivors in most cases heard before the IACHR. Roxanna Altholz, the CEJIL lawyer who served as lead counsel in the Myrna Mack case, explained that the organization seeks cases that are “emblematic of a wider set of violations” (R. Altholz 2004: personal comm., May 11). And certainly the Myrna Mack case carried this weight. When Myrna Mack was murdered, on September 11, 1990, she was studying the displacement of thousands of indigenous Guatemalans. As an anthropologist with international notoriety, Mack’s findings were embarrassing to those in power, many of whom were complicit in the disappearances. The case, therefore, is symbolic of several of the deepest wounds inflicted during the thirty-year civil war. Because of Myrna Mack’s work, the case symbolized the effort to reveal the truth about the thousands of Mayan Guatemalans killed during the war. Also, because the state made every effort to block justice in the case, the result was a victory over the rampant impunity plaguing Guatemala. Myrna Mack’s sister, Helen, testified before the IACHR that the “case is a paradigmatic one not only for her family but also for many Guatemalans who see themselves reflected in it” and that by litigating it she was “representing, with dignity, the thousands of victims who had no chance” (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003).

The Plan de Sancheze case clearly had these broad implications. During the civil war the Guatemalan military and civil patrols frequently attacked Mayan villages—murdering and disappearing thousands of indigenous Guatemalans. The Plan de Sancheze massacre, therefore, represented one of the most common and most horrific practices of the repressive regimes. As one of the victims testified before the IACHR, “During the 15 years after the death of our loved ones, there has been repression on the part of the authorities in the area—they try to stop us from performing our cultural practices and or from celebrating our religious ceremonies” (Plan de Sancheze v. Guatemala 2004: para.38). Representatives and victims have been attempting to hold accountable the powerful figures responsible for these killings for more than twenty years.

Similar cases benefit from the Plan de Sancheze IACHR litigation. For example the Tuluche massacre case involves indigenous villagers who were also labeled as subversives during the civil war and were extra judicially executed. Attempts to hold accountable those who planned and participated in the massacre were repeatedly blocked by the infrastructure of impunity entrenched in the Guatemalan judicial system (Warner 2005). Much like Plan de Sancheze, the Tuluche case in Guatemala was plagued by death threats, the dismissal of important evidence, as well as arbitrary acquittals of those accused. The results of the Plan de Sancheze case in the IACHR, and other cases like it, have the ability to bring justice for Mayans by creating a domino effect of legal accountability for thousands accused of similar human rights violations in Guatemala.

As discussed above the Court required public apologies not only to the victims and their families but to the affected communities and the Guatemalan people. In the Plan de Sancheze case the Court further demonstrated the importance of public recognition in that it ordered the state to publicize key sections of the Court’s judgments in its official gazette and in a major national newspaper in both Spanish language and Achi Maya (Associated
Press 2005). The Court ordered the state to enact policies to support the growth and welfare of the Maya in the Plan de Sanchez Municipality with measures to promote the Achi Maya language and culture (Associated Press 2005).

The Carpio case had similarly broad implications. Jorge Carpio Nicolle was murdered because of his opposition to an amnesty provision that would have prevented legal accountability for thousands accused of human rights violations. He was a reform activist and a journalist who frequently spoke out against the Guatemalan military state and efforts to preserve impunity. His wife, Martha Arrivillaga de Carpio, testified during the trial before the IACHR that the Carpio case was “emblematic of the injustice in Guatemala” (Arrivillaga de Carpio 2004).

Indeed it was clear that the IACHR realized these implications in handling these cases. Instead of merely awarding reparations the Court frequently requires the state take concrete steps to address the broad class of victims not included in the case. It sets out to attack broad problems through individual cases. CEJIL lawyer, Soraya Long, argued in an interview that “the court uses its judgments to break systemic and structural failings and solve the macro problems” facing nations under its jurisdiction (S. Long 2004: personal comm., July 5).

In the Carpio case, the Court also assessed remedies designed to address weaknesses in Guatemala. For example, in addition to traditional compensatory damages, the Court ordered the state to take concrete steps to prevent similar violations (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). In its ruling, the Court targeted the widespread, systematic impunity ordering a full investigation to identify and to punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the attack and the subsequent obstruction of justice (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004). For example, the Court ordered the state to remove all “obstacles and mechanisms… that maintain impunity” and to provide security for all witnesses, judges and prosecutors (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004: para.134). According to the order all information discovered in the investigation must be made public because the victims, their families, and the Guatemalan people, the Court stressed, have “a right to the truth” (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004: para.128). The Court stretched its authority even further and ruled that to the extent legislation may have granted the attackers amnesty, it is invalid because such laws violate the victims’ rights to justice and the truth (Carpio v. Guatemala 2004).

Creating a Historical Record

Recognizing the victims’ story and enshrining it in the judicial record are essential parts of achieving justice for human rights violations (Teital 1997; Minow 1998). In these cases, the state denied responsibility and obstructed any effort to find the truth. To the victims, therefore, the official recognition of the truth is invaluable. In its judgment in the Myrna Mack case the IACHR ordered Guatemala to publicize a full account of its violations because “This right to the truth… constitutes an important means of reparation” (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003: para. 274).

When the Myrna Mack case reached the IACHR, Guatemala offered to accept responsibility for the killing but the state was not willing to allow witnesses to testify (R. Altholz 2004: personal comm., May 11). CEJIL’s Roxanna Altholz, the lead counsel representing the Mack family, opposed Guatemala’s offer. In an interview Ms. Altholz stated that they refused Guatemala’s offer because “we didn’t want a sentence that just recognized responsibility and went on to reparations” (R. Altholz 2004: personal comm., May 11). She pointed out that “we wanted, and it was very important for [Myrna Mack’s sister] Helen, to have all these pages of hechos probados [proven facts]” (R. Altholz 2004: personal comm., May 11). More than that, Ms. Altholz stated, “what was so important for us was to have the
hechos probados include an indication that the state security forces were responsible—that was fundamental for us” (R. Altholz 2004: personal comm., May 11). Not only did the IACHR include in its decision an exhaustive account of these hechos probados but it ordered Guatemala to publish them in the “official gazette” and another daily newspaper with national circulation (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003: para. 280). In all its cases CEJIL stresses the importance of allowing the victims and families to tell their stories in open court. Roxanna Altholz pointed out that allowing victims an opportunity to create a historical record and to express their suffering is an essential element of seeking justice. She stated that “the more you can let the victims’ voices come through the better your litigation is—the legal theories ring truer, your case is stronger” (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003: para. 280).

This interest can be seen in the Carpio case as well. Even after Guatemala accepted responsibility for the violations, CEJIL lawyers encouraged their witnesses—the families of the victims—to testify extensively on their experiences, their suffering, and their loss. CEJIL lawyers asked the court to “establish that the attack was a politically motivated execution” (Mack Chang v. Guatemala 2003: para. 280). They asked the court to set out an official version of the truth by determining the specific acts and omissions that amounted to violations of the Convention and by assigning institutional responsibility (Davis 2004). The representative of the state did not object to allowing this testimony, “recogniz[ing] the right of the victims to testify and tell their truth” (Davis 2004). The victims’ counsel, Soraya Long, pointed out in an interview that for “the Carpio family... it was very significant to come here to [the Inter-American Court] because with the internal proceeding they felt thwarted... and to come to this court and say what occurred, to establish a record and to demonstrate that they had overcome” (S. Long 2004: personal comm., July 5).

Never has the importance of creating a historical record been more evident than in the Plan de Sanchez case. The IACHR recognized the injury inflicted by the state’s repeated denials and obstruction. It held that “the impunity in this case keeps the memory of these acts fresh and impedes social reconciliation (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004: para. 49.18). An expert on the rights of indigenous peoples, Augusto Willemsen-Diaz, testified that “[t]o end the discrimination and racism of the indigenous people in Guatemala I recommend that the most important things are the acknowledgment of what occurred and that the people take notice of the enormous amount of abuses that have occurred” (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004: para.38). The anguish in the victims’ stories was memorialized in the Court’s opinion. In the testimony of a family member, Juan Manuel Jerónimo, he says “the following day the bodies of our loved ones were still decomposing when the military commissioners from Chipuerta arrived... They did the most savage of burials and we were no longer able to recognize our relatives” (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004: para. 38). The decision also included testimony regarding the impunity entrenched in the Guatemalan legal system. Another family member, Buenaventura Manuel Jerónimo, stated that “the violence, the corruption, and the discrimination against the Indigenous peoples and farmers impeded justice.” He continued, “Until this day there are threats against the judges” who hear these cases against the state (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004: para. 38). Through this testimony in front of the IACHR Guatemala’s violent past and present were finally given a voice.

The IACHR is effective in setting out these histories. In its decisions the hechos probados sections are extensive memorializing the victims’ stories, the violations, and the impunity. For example, in the Carpio case, the IACHR included an account of Mr. Carpio’s work for Guatemalan democracy through his government service, political activism, and leadership of the newspaper “El Grafico” (Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala 2004:
paras. 76.15–76.16). CEJIL’s Soraya Long stressed the importance of establishing a historical record. She commented in an interview that “Carpio’s work exists in the fabric of Guatemala—in acts of the assembly, in articles of the constitution—his family demands that their father—their husband—be included in the history of his country” (S. Long 2004: personal comm., July 5).

Conclusions—Impact of the Inter-American Court

Our analysis demonstrates that the Inter-American Court is a valuable factor promoting human rights accountability and reconciliation in Latin America (See Table 1). It is a powerful voice of accountability in a region struggling to fully democratize. By holding states accountable it demonstrates to citizens that overcoming impunity is possible. The Court’s jurisprudence thus, to use Teitel’s language, “evinces the clear delimiting of state power on the basis of individual rights norms” (Teitel 1997: 2054). Lawyers, judges, and activists then seek human rights protections in domestic institutions armed with the principles of law established by the Court. This positive impact is accentuated when the activists pursue, and the Court hears, cases that are emblematic of broader human rights problems. Finally, in each case the Court enshrines the victims’ stories of suffering into a historical record. After years of official denial, the Inter-American Court represents an official acceptance of the truth.

There are several critiques that may be levied at the Inter-American system. Posner and Yoo correctly point out that the IACHR hears very few cases and that compliance rates are questionable (Posner and Yoo 2005). Rodriguez Rescia and Setitles argue that the delay in processing cases, along with procedural deficiencies and normative problems, are significant failings of the system (Rescia and Setitles 2000). One can see support for this in the Carpio case—which was filed in 1994 and resolved in 2004. Indeed these critiques have some merit and this essay is not intended to refute them. On the contrary, we conclude that even with these weaknesses the IACHR is still indispensable in aiding reconciliation and democratization for the postconflict democracies in Latin America. The system would be even more effective if it addressed many of the concerns voiced by critics.

In postconflict democracies, domestic courts struggle for legitimacy, resources, and a meaningful role in their state’s political discourse. However, as arms of the state, they often share the state’s interest in quieting efforts to uncover past atrocities. Moreover, they are frequently subject to influence from the other political powers (Dodson and Jackson 2001; Davis 2006). When litigants are able to reach beyond the state for justice, they escape this institutional deck heavily stacked against them.

Human rights observers often note the effect of the IACHR’s work. For example, in its 2005 Report, Human Rights Watch observed that the “Inter-American human rights system has provided an important venue for human rights advocates seeking to press the state to accept responsibility for abuses” (Human Rights 2005). Similarly, after the Carpio, Mack, and Plan de Sánchez cases, Amnesty International recognized that, although Guatemala is still suffering serious human rights violations, it has achieved “minor progress in trying past cases of genocide or crimes against humanity” (Amnesty International 2005). Moreover, Amnesty International pointed out that after these cases the Berger administration “took some positive measures including modernization of the army and establishing a National Reparations Commission” (Amnesty International 2005). Similar effects can be seen in other nations appearing before the Court. For example, Helio Bicudo credits the Court’s rulings with helping Peru restore democracy and the integrity of its judiciary after President Fujimori’s attempt to circumvent constitutional constraints (Bicudo, 2002).
During the Carpio hearing, Silvia Villacorta, the wife of one of the victims, told the Court that “in Guatemala there is no justice so we must look to international justice.” “We want,” she told the judges, “a precedent that future generations can look to” (Davis 2004). While the institutions and procedures of the Inter-American Court need strengthening, it is a positive—and necessary—force for human rights accountability in the region. It offers victims like Silvia Villacorta the justice she deserved.

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