This article, based on new analyses of primary documents and data,
demonstrates that in one critical episode, the Americans' code-breaking Battle of the Atlantic,
there was a great overestimation of the influence of codebreaking. The histories of the
American Navy’s World War II Atlantic crypto-accomplishments have unintentionally
raised the intelligence ‘achievement bar’ far, far too high. Admittedly, there were then
few people and resources, but not as much was accomplished as commonly thought-—there could not
have been. Successful intelligence gathering then, as well as now, was a tough, on-going,
and resource-hungry activity and there have never been overnight miracles. The inherited views
of the building of the American Bombes and of the military consequences of reading the U-boat
Shark messages during World War II are examples of unintended myth-making.
"Grombach and the Pond's Last Hurrah,
the Theft of Soviet Ciphers, 1954 "
A recent FBI FOIA release on 1954's proposed theft of
Soviet cipher materials throws new light on the career of John V. Grombach and the
CIA related activities of his Pond espionage organization during the Cold War.
"Information and Intrigue, Acknowledgements"
Only a few of those who have helped me so much with research
on information history over the last two decades can be recognized. All others,
please forgive me.
"Information and Intrigue, Illustrative Bibliography"
During this study many hundreds of books and articles were surveyed,
too many to list. This ongoing sample bibliography of secondary works presents some of the more
interesting publically available items. The list is constantly being edited and modified.
"The Number of Antebellum Colleges, More Evidence"
A recent discovery of long overlooked U.S. Census series on
the number of colleges in the United States, 1840-1860, suggests that the estimates in the
book American Collegiate Populations remain viable but that new explorations may prove worthwhile.
"Intelligence Tests, Colleges and the Nation,
WWI to WWII, A Quantitative Look"
. Another examination of the results of intelligence tests
for college admissions, and for the American Army’s recruits, from the era of WWI
to the Korean War and beyond gives a more varied and detailed picture of the American
college student.
“New Twists on Old Tales, Crypto Triumphs and Political Meddling:
Japanese Codes and the Election of 1944
”
New evidence from NARA collections of OSS and NSA documents indicates that General George C.
Marshall’s attempt during the 1944 election campaign to convince Thomas E. Dewey to avoid mentioning the United States’
ability to read Japan’s most important codes since the late 1930s was a more complex
and perhaps politically charged event than even the skilled historian David Alvarez realized. Critical to Marshall’s argument
was that the Allies’ ability to read the important Japanese Military Attaché code (JMA) had been blocked for a critical
year as the result of an inept break-in of the Japanese legation in Lisbon, Portugal by the heavy-handed agents
of America’s Office of Strategic Services during the summer of 1943. Marshall used the Lisbon story to convince Dewey
that any mention of Allied codebreaking in 1944 would lead Japan to change all its codes. Marshall’s Lisbon tale was
incorrect and his own advisors who knew the true story, such as Carter Clarke, did not step forward in 1944, or later,
to correct the error, perhaps because of a combination of patriotism, dislike of the OSS, and politics.