Summary: India-Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir

 

At the end of British occupation in 1947, two countries stood where there once was one. Pakistan divided with the intention of being the nation for the Muslims of India. Kashmir, the roots of the boundary dispute between the two nations, was an autonomous state under British rule and remained so post-partition, when initially given a choice between Pakistan and India. Eventually though, in October of 1947, the ruling prince of Kashmir decided in India favor. This decision was viewed as fraudulent, unfair, and completely unrecognized by the Pakistani government.

Due to its strategic position and unique and exquisite nature, Kashmir has been of particular interest to both countries. The main goal of Islamabad is to gain control of this region, thus completing the vision of an independent Muslim state outside of India considering that Kashmir is majority Muslim. New Delhi, on the other hand, has the goal of retaining Kashmir in order to support the portrayal of India as a secular nation.

·   In 1948, the first Kashmir war was fought between the Indian troops and Pakistani pathans invading from the northwest of the Kashmir region. This primary war ended with UN intervention and a mutual agreement to a formation of a Line of Control, the ceasefire line that the troops of both nations were withdrawn behind.

·   The second war was fought in 1965 and the third in 1971. Each of these wars resulted in 11 UN resolutions and two significant agreements, namely the Tashkent Declaration of 1966 and the Simla agreement of 1972.

·   By 1974, India began nuclear testing in its northern desert. In 1998, Pakistan also showed signs of significant nuclear capability. More armed conflict ensued in 1999 until finally ceasefire and peace talks began between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee. Unfortunately, these are all retarded by increasing conflict in the disputed region, specifically with the August 2001 railway massacre in Jammu, the Kashmiri assembly attacks in October 2001, and the Indian parliament attack in December of the very same year. This triggered military build-up by both nations on the line of control, increased diplomatic sanctions, the end of transport links between the two countries and an announcement by Indian military of a keen preparation for imminent war.

·   Initially, 2003 saw both nations using forceful rhetoric in relation to their readiness and capability to endure nuclear warfare. Throughout the 90 and continuing into the 21st century, the low-intensity war that has continued within this region between Indian military and Pakistan militant groups has cost both nations a large loss of life and resources.

·   Despite continuous militant attacks, both nations eventually attempted to reach peaceful negotiations over the border dispute, including the establishment of sporting ties, transportation links, official cease-fire arrangements, and recognition of Kashmiri separatist groups by India.

This conflict is evidently an enduring one in the sense throughout the years of military fighting, there is a single goal of obtaining the prize, i.e. Kashmiri territory. The payoffs are high and at each stage in the enduring conflict, both nations have the chance to decide whether to continue the conflict in order to gain exactly what they desire or pull out and therefore lose. If both India and Pakistan cooperate, they will be better off by avoiding greater numbers of casualties and avoiding the possibility brinkmanship, considering the nuclear capability on both sides. In relation to proliferation of their nuclear capabilities, if both India and Pakistan refrain from communicating (diplomatically through vocal, cooperative or bargaining tactics) and choose to continue with the build up of their respective nuclear arsenals, each nation has a significant incentive to defect from a credible agreement against such build up in order to maintain their respective interests.

Noteworthy is the fact that both nations have the incentive to remain in credible commitments for the long-term despite incomplete information because of both of their desires to maintain a certain reputation and gain US aid as well as India goal of obtaining a seat on the UN Security Council. That being said, the lack of constructive communication and the aforementioned rhetoric of the capability on both sides to endure nuclear attack has initiated a fear of possible tit-for-tat actions regardless of who moves preemptively and therefore resulting in a rise in the escalation ladder that may not be able to be stopped or managed later.