POLI 388                                                                                                                        Spring 2005

GUIDE TO FINAL EXAM

            The Final Exam will have two parts. The first part (probably constituting 48 minutes) will focus exclusively on material covered since the in-class midterm test and it will be generally similar in format to the Part I of that test — that is, it will be composed of short-answer items with some choice. The second part (probably constituting 72 minutes) will be more comprehensive and integrative in nature, asking you to bring together material presented in different parts of the course. It will include a mixture of shorter and more specific questions and longer essay questions. You will have some choice either among or within questions.

            Items in the first part of the final will be drawn from the Review List on the back of this page, together with some additional items drawn from the “executive summaries” of student research projects posted on the course website. Note that this Review List includes some items (pertaining to bargaining tactics) that also appeared on the Review List for the Midterm but were not actually covered on that test (because they had not yet been fully covered in class). Not all items on the Review List are equally important, and the items that you will be presented with on the exam will certainly emphasize more important rather than less important ones. Some of the items on the Review List are unlikely to be used as questions but you might well use them within answers to other questions. Familiarity with the items on this Review List will also enable you to cite specific facts, examples, concepts, issues, etc., in your longer essay answers in the second part of the final, and such specifics certainly will be rewarded in the grading. (Of course, the latter point applies with respect items on the Review List for the mid-term exam, so you should review the earlier Review List as well as this one.)

            For purposes of general review and especially in preparation for the second part of the final exam, it is recommended that you review the list of questions pertaining to international conflict and cooperation that was distributed with the syllabus at the beginning of the semester (a backup copy is attached) and think about how you would now answer them. You should recognize that we have addressed some of these questions explicitly and at considerable length, others more indirectly and briefly, and some not at all; their relevance for the final exam varies accordingly. You should also think about how the strategic concepts we have considered in this course (summarized in the Review Lists for the mid-term and final exams) apply to various international crises and conflicts. (You have already thought about such applications with respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis and also, presumably, with respect to your research topic.) Finally you should think about whether (and why) you find these strategic concepts to be useful in understanding such events — or, as the case may be, not so useful or even misleading.

            Remember that several topics and readings have been deleted from the syllabus. Topic #12 was deleted, Topic #25 will not be covered in class, and Topics #23 and #24 will be covered at best in an only abbreviated fashion. You can skip the readings by Hagerty and Schelling (on “Nuclear Terrorism”) if you wish. The following additional readings listed on the syllabus have been cancelled:

            Readings for Topic #12

            Masterman, THE DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM, Chapter 1

            Payne, AMERICAN THREAT, Chapters 1 & 2

(However, the Masterman and Payne readings were discussed in class.)

Review List for Final Exam

generic bargaining (Chicken) game

Hostage Holding Game

bargaining tactics: “give in” vs. “stand firm”

bargaining tactics: pre-play communications

“rationality of irrationality”

credibility (of commitments, threats, and promises)

reputation effects

bargaining tactics: strategic moves (as defined by Schelling and Dixit & Nalebuff)

“the art of commitment”

“trip wire”

“threat that leave something to chance”

“doomsday machine”

“last clear chance” effect

“decomposing” the execution of a threat

Dollar Auction / Enduring Conflict Game

generalized (or extended) deterrence

tactics for “decommitment”

tactical vs strategic surprise

signals vs. noise

purposeful vs. inadvertent signaling (NRM, “Signals and Communications,” returned with take-home midterm assignment)

signal (or “cheap talk”) vs. index (or “costly signal”)

intercepting (and decoding) enemy messages: “Magic” and the “Ultra-secret”

“turning” agents into double-agents: “Double-Cross System” [Masterman]

defense vs. deterrence

offense vs. compellence

observability of successful deterrence

the “appeasement theory of war” (deterrence failure) [Payne]

the “excitation theory of war” [Payne]

            “spiral model”

            “security dilemma”

pre-emptive vs. preventive war

impact of nuclear weapons (plus long-range delivery systems) on international politics

U.S. nuclear monopoly

countervalue vs. counterforce targeting

preclusive vs. non-preclusive first strike capability

RAND Report on the Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases

Wohlstetter, “Delicate Balance of Terror”

            “automatic” vs. “delicate” balance

secure second-strike capability: Wohlstetter’s “six hurdles”

accidental war and “fail-safe” systems

the U.S. nuclear “triad”

mutual deterrence/mutual assured destruction (MAD)/mutual assured vulnerability

multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs)

“launch on warning”

extended deterrence

controlled response

strategic defense and ABM treaty

civil defense

Shaded items have not been covered in class as of May 10.

Remember that the scheduled time and place for the final exam is Wednesday, May 25, 1:00-3:00 PM, in SS 113. Please see me in advance if this time presents a real problem for you.

Research Reports are due Thursday, May 26, by email.