"Sex" versus "Gender" Revisited

The meaning(s) of "sex" and "gender" and the frequent confusion of these
terms came up for discussion again on WMST-L in September/October 2006. This
file contains that discussion.  See also the earlier file, Sex versus Gender.   
For additional WMST-L files now available on the Web, see the 
WMST-L File Collection.

Hi All,

 
I just read yet another article that was talking about (and measured)
sex differences in domestic violence but then drew conclusions about
gender and domestic violence. 

I thought the social sciences figured out that there was a difference
between sex and gender 30 years ago. Even the American Medical
Association acknowledges that making this distinction is essential for
decent research and clear writing. This is a mainstream conceptual
distinction that is absolutely essential for studying, communicating
about and understanding human behavior. 

Can anyone explain to me why people who study human behavior for a
living still conflate these terms and concepts?

I really want to understand. 

Conflating these terms and concepts leads to a lot of really inaccurate
and completely incomprehensible writing. Why?

Thanks,

 
Molly Dragiewicz
Assistant Professor
Faculty of Criminology, Justice, and Policy Studies
University of Ontario Institute of Technology

Molly.Dragiewicz  AT  uoit.ca

Hi Molly.  I have had a theory for some time now that the species homo 
sapiens is congenitally learning-disabled.  It's the only remotely 
plausable explanation for this sort of thing.

Deb Louis
dlouis44  AT  sbcglobal.net

Hi everyone,
I don't think this addresses Molly's concerns about the article she 
read, but I do think it might add to the confusion a bit. Up front, 
I'd also like to say that in my own opinion, troubling this 
distinction is a good thing, not a bad one.

In queer theory, trans studies, and cultural studies, some people are 
working to trouble the "sex/gender" distinction. The underlying 
argument is that biology is no less a cultural construct than 
socialization is.

Please note that saying "biology is a cultural construct" *does not* 
mean that biology doesn't exist. Rather, it means that the 
oh-so-comfortable categories we use to distinguish "the sexes" are 
categories we have made up, and that this categorization organizes 
and narrows a range of biological differences by 1. imposing a false 
binary upon it; and (simultaneously) 2. erasing the existence of 
those who don't fit into that binary. And, the argument goes, since 
our linguistic categorization organizes and shapes our knowledge and 
understanding, then we should acknowledge the influence of that 
categorization whenever we talk about topics like "biology," 
"nature," etc.--topics that we have historically tended to 
essentialize.

Some of the theorists who struggle with this questioning include
Judith Butler (whose newer work, Gender Trouble, is accessible and 
applies her earlier theories); Jacquelyn Zita (I like the essays in 
*Body Talk* for teaching about this); Joan Roughgarden (evolutionary 
biologist; I highly recommend her *Evolution's Rainbow*); Kate 
Bornstein (*Gender Outlaw* does a very good job of explaining this 
questioning for an undergraduate student audience); and Riki Anne 
Wilchins.

Not all of these theorists would argue (as Bornstein does) that 
gender is an identity category and sex is an act, but all explore the 
complexities around the question of the "difference between" sex and 
gender.

I have to wonder if this kind of exploration has placed scholars at a 
transitional moment, when perhaps the definitions of sex and gender 
are shifting.
Peace, all,
Jeannie
-- 
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
Jeannie Ludlow, Ph.D.		jludlow  AT  bgnet.bgsu.edu
Undergraduate Advisor
Women's Studies
228 East Hall
Bowling Green State U
Bowling Green OH 43403

It may be because "sex" differences are biological and "gender"  
differences are social, cultural, and behavioral, so people who say  
"sex" differences really believe that the differences are innate.   
Also, people often say "gender" instead of "sex" because of the many  
meanings of the word "sex."  They think it is somehow more polite to  
say "gender."  I have heard scientists at conferences report that  
"the gender of the rats was male."  Rats, of course, don't do gender.

Joan

Hi Molly,

Sadly, some people/groups/disciplines benefit from the conflation of  
sex, gender and sexuality while others benefit from their  
disentanglement. The instance you mention seems to be but another  
sign of reflexive and unconscious (hetero)sexism in society. Or an  
author who hasn't kept up with the literature. Or both. ;-)

m
********************
Michael J. Murphy, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate, Art History and Archaeology
Instructor, Women and Gender Studies
mjmurphy  AT  wustl.edu

"Liberalism is, I think, resurgent. One reason is that more and more  
people are so painfully aware of the alternative."
					-John Kenneth Galbraith

Apart from the points already made by other respondents to Molly's query,
I believe the confusion between the terms sex and gender is also the result 
of the
ever-greater expansion of the notion of "social construction."  In early
second-wave feminism (and in fact long before that), the distinction between
sex-as-biological-differences [male-female] and "sex roles" as behavior and
attributed characteristics [masculine-feminine] was clear, and the term
"gender" was assigned to the latter. Even those who wrote about the
inevitable interaction between the biological and the social among humans
didn't have difficulty recognizing the existence of sexual dimorphism or
bimorphism in most animals, including humans.

 But in the last two decades the notion of social construction has been
subjected to extraordinary "concept stretching,"  so that, for example, on
this list we have had lengthy arguments about biology, with some people
denying the reality of sexual bimorphism altogether (and not just for a
small percentage of infants).  These people typically see male-female as
categories assigned at birth by patriarchal doctors or, as argued by Anne
Fausto-Sterling --  who seems to engage in intentional slippage between the
biological and the social --  that we "construct our bodies."   In other
words, the scope of "social construction" has steadily been enlarged in the
writings of many feminists, so that the distinction between the biological
and the social has eroded and with it has come increased confusion about the
terms sex and gender.

The WMST-L archives contain often heated discussions of these issues, which
recur periodically.  See, for example, the archives for early 2001.
Contrary to what Jeannie Ludlow wrote today, these discussions indicate that
 some people on this list (and in their  writing) deny that biology exists 
independently of
social constructionism.  It seems to me clear why this argument is
important for  feminists: it relates to our species' undeniable history
of sexual reproduction, which depends upon the existence of male and female
AND indicates that heterosexuality is "normal" and has existed for eons.

The word "normal," of course, is highly contentious, because of its
many meanings.  And in order to undermine its political/judgmental
sense, some activists feel obliged to attack heterosexuality itself;
in turn, this attack is facilitated if one can argue that biological
difference is socially constructed.

Noretta Koertge and I have written about these matters in the new
edition of our book "Professing Feminism" (expanded edition, 2003),
which contains an additional 150 pages of text (plus 30 pages of
documentation) entitled "Part Two: Women's Studies in the New
Millennium."  See my chapter 11 and also Noretta's chapter 12.

 DP

Uh-oh, I'm agreeing with Daphne again. If biological sexual dimorphism
was just a social construction, we wouldn't be here. Reproduction
counts for something.  If some tiny percent of people are born
biologically sexually anomalous, like the intersexed , why does that
call biological sexual dimorphism into question? There are many
genetic anomalies, like extra fingers  and conjoined twins. But
basically, people are born with ten fingers, and live in individual
bodies. We don't go around saying, well, actually it's just the
hegemonic discourse of digits that makes us think of people as having
ten fingers. In fact,  some have nine, some have eleven, some are born
with no hands at all! Nor do we say, actually, physical individuality
is another social construct-- look at siamese twins!
What one does about genetic anomalies like intersex is a social
decision, of course. But it's a different question than that of
whether sexual dimorphism is a social construct in the first place.

Katha Pollitt
katha.pollitt  AT  gmail.com

Katha Pollitt wrote:
>If biological sexual dimorphismwas just a social construction, we wouldn't 
>be here. Reproduction
>counts for something.

I am sympathetic to Katha's observation that socially-constructed as we are, 
sometimes biology rules the day. However, I think that we do need to examine 
the assertion that there are two sexes biologically. If we are starting the 
argument from the ability to reproduce, do we mean that humans reproduce by 
means of uniting two forms of gamete? That seems true. Do we mean that most 
humans are capable of producing only one form of gamete? I can accept that 
as true, although it would be very important to note that at this point we 
encounter the idea of a continuum--bodies develop on a continuum, with 
sperm-only at one end and egg-only at the other. To see only the poles of 
the continuum is to socially construct a biological phenomenon. Do we mean 
that people who produce eggs always have mammary glands and lack facial hair 
and are of slight build and have labia and clitorises less that a certain 
length, etc., and that people who produce sperm always have facial hair and 
heavy builds and penises longer than a certain length and lack breasts and 
labia--now I think that the continuum has begun to assert itself. We have 
the idea of biologically male and biologically female bodies, but do we 
really mean sperm- and egg-producing, or do we mean that all these other 
highly variant structures have to conform for a body to be "biologically" 
male or female? Social construction of biological phenomena is in full swing 
at this point.

Chris Wilson Simpkins
cwilson  AT  sfsu.edu

I see from Chris Simpkins' message that the discussion is about to repeat 
precisely what has already been debated many times on this list.  Wouldn't 
it be more useful if people read the old stuff and then commented?    I 
don't care what people believe personally; I do care when it's a matter of 
educating (or miseducating) our students or creating public policy based on 
myths.  Good policies depend upon a recognition of the facts and an 
understanding of their consequences even when we may not like them.  So does 
real education. Before everyone jumps on me, let me be clear that I am not 
arguing that biology is necessarily destiny  ( though it appears many people 
believe this, which helps explain the hostility of many feminists -- and 
others --  toward biological explanations).  That would be absurd, as a 
simple example demonstrates:  nearsightedness is a biological reality -- and 
very easy to fix.  But I do think education based on tendentious claims that 
are politically congenial but inaccurate is bound to be a disaster.

DP 

Daphne Patai wrote:
"Good policies depend upon a recognition of the facts ... So does real 
education."

Fact 1: With the large standard deviations for many characteristics, sexual 
dimorphism in humans is simply not as pronounced as in other species.

Fact 2: We experience human sexual dimorphism as very pronounced.

I agree that scholarship, teaching, and policy must take into account both 
these facts.

Chris Wilson Simpkins
cwilson  AT  sfsu.edu

In response to Katha but to the whole group:
As I discuss with my students in my introductory class this coming week, the
"social construction" of gender is about the _meaning_ "we" (each society)
make(s) of that _apparent_ dimorphism.  There is nothing "sacred" about two
genders; other groups outside Western industrial and post-industrial
societies, such as Native American tribes, designate three "sexes" or
genders. And the experience of intersex people shows us how _gender_
influences biological or physiological sex - who would care if someone had
"ambiguous genitals" if this was not the case?  The entire system is a
_sex/gender system_ (pace Gayle Rubin) and I would use an ampersand as well
as a slash to make clear how related these two terms are.
Barbara Scott Winkler, Director, Women's Studies
Southern Oregon University

winklerb  AT  charter.net or winklerb  AT  sou.edu

> Katha Pollitt wrote:
>> If biological sexual dimorphismwas just a social construction, we  
>> wouldn't be here. Reproduction
>> counts for something.

New reproductive freedom/ reproductive technologies can complicate  
this assertion, though. As we need particular bodies less for  
reproduction, does the salience of those categories become more on  
par with number of fingers or eye color?  Or is that just theoretical  
pie-in-the-sky for the millions of women who are engaged in (unpaid)  
reproductive labor and experiencing a narrowing of reproductive  
freedom ?

I have really appreciated Iris Marion Young's article arguing that  
the historical process of being named "women" and living as women  
gives the category meaning and that we can engage that meaning  
pragmatically, holding out an examination of the fiction of the  
category even while we claim it as politically useful.

  Young, Iris Marion. 1994. "Gender as Seriality: Thinking About  
Women as a Social Collective." Signs 19: 3 (Spring): 713-738, Spring  
1994.

*************************
Kimberly Simmons
kcs  AT  maine.rr.com

 
 I have argued, probably simplistically, in my crosscultural
 developmental psych classes (I am a postcolonial sociologist),
 discoursed (I hesitate to say 'taught') with a feminist perspective,
 that:
 
 "sex" is genitalia (primary) and secondary physical/maturational
 characteristics and all thoughts and acts associated with them
 (fueled by dopamine and norepinephrine in the cingulate and caudate!)
 
 "gender" is the entire (which does not mean exhaustive) and expanding
 constellation of socially constructed (therefore cultural) meanings,
 for the individual and for the social group, associated with "sex".
 
 Can we permit a considerable measure of Cartesian interactive dualism
 in feminist theoretical formulations about "sex" and "gender"? Yes,
 in fact we must.
 
 I am not sure that "anomalous" and "dimorphism" are theoretically
 helpful (unless we admit and disclaim those labels to be limiting and
 temporary) because they serve to constrain and therefore privilege
 supposedly non-anomalous and normative biological and cultural
 phenomena.
 
 Theory itself is socially constructed accretional meaning. The half
 decade of advances in biology, medicine and biomedical technology and
 the socially constructed meanings about these advances (or setbacks),
 need to be accommodated (as they are in this thread) in feminist
 thought and action on "sex" and "gender"
 
 I have very little theoretical understanding on this topic.
 
 Best,
 
 Chithra KarunaKaran
  <CKarunaKaran03  AT  netscape.net>     

Today I am teaching The Sacred Hoop by Paula Gunn Allen to a graduate wst
class and I will find a useful jumping off point in the recent exchanges on
sex and gender. Specifically, Kimberly Simmons quotes Katha Pollit. 

> Katha Pollitt wrote:

>> If biological sexual dimorphismwas just a social construction, we 
>> wouldn't be here. Reproduction counts for something.

Then, Kimberly Simmons states:

>>New reproductive freedom/ reproductive technologies can complicate this
assertion, though. As we need particular bodies less for reproduction, does
the salience of those categories become more on par with number of fingers
or eye color?  Or is that just theoretical pie-in-the-sky for the millions
of women who are engaged in (unpaid) reproductive labor and experiencing a
narrowing of reproductive freedom ?

>>I have really appreciated Iris Marion Young's article arguing that the
historical process of being named "women" and living as women gives the
category meaning and that we can engage that meaning pragmatically, holding
out an examination of the fiction of the category even while we claim it as
politically useful.

>>>  Young, Iris Marion. 1994. "Gender as Seriality: Thinking About Women as
a Social Collective." Signs 19: 3 (Spring): 713-738, Spring 1994.<<


To this exchange, I would suggest that tt might be helpful to
reconceptualize reproduction and consider how it >counts< from
non-patriarchal and non-Western perspectives. Paula Gunn Allen in The Sacred
Hoop. draws upon Keres Native American philosophy/theology to tell us that
the Earth is a womb, whose core is fire, that the power of woman is the
center of the universe and is both heart (womb) and thought (creativity). 

Of course, all this sounds utterly wrong if one is enmeshed in Western
patriarchal (religious, philosophical and scientific) definitions and
categories of thought, e.g., the severance of mind or spirit from body, the
ensuing disrespect for and misunderstanding of matter, and the notion that
reproduction is a brute, unintelligent process (which of course, it must be,
because women are largely responsible for it).  Native American philosophy
identifies thinking with procreation or reproduction as epitomized in the
sacred figure of Thinking Woman, the creator in Keres cosmology. 

The idea of the body as social artifact and reproduction as mechanical
function seems to me to be a fulfillment of Western patriarchal thought, not
a challenge to it.

Jane Caputi

jcaputi  AT  adelphia.net

It's of course true that current research makes it likely sexual 
reproduction will be unnecessary in the future -- with hard to foresee 
consequences (this has been a favorite theme of utopian and dystopian 
fiction for generations).  But that doesn't alter the reality that our 
history as a species is one of sexual reproduction via male/female coupling.

And, of course, as Kimberly notes,  the majority of women in the world will 
continue to procreate the old fashioned way for years to come.

DP 

Katha Pollitt wrote: "If biological sexual dimorphism
was just a social construction, we wouldn't be here. Reproduction
counts for something.  If some tiny percent of people are born
biologically sexually anomalous, like the intersexed , why does 
that call biological sexual dimorphism into question?"


Genderism is the belief that there are, and should only be, two 
sexes/genders. It is also the belief that most or all aspects of 
gender are inevitably tied to biological sex. Genderism, as a 
socio-cultural institution, perpetuates discrimination against 
transgender and intersex individuals. 

As a self-identified trans-feminist, I am interested in  
challenging the hegemonic belief structure around gender in our 
society. In feminism, androcentric viewpoints were rightly 
interrogated as part and parcel of patriarchy and as being 
partial, frequently inaccurate and often sexist and 
misogynistic.  

One of the things that is happening now is the emergence of 
trans and intersex studies. Just as feminists challenged and 
continue to challenge the masculinist hegemony in the pursuit of 
knowledge, now more and more trans and intersex folks (and 
allies) working in women's/gender studies are demanding that the 
specificities of our own social locations be acknowledged and 
validated. Not all people in society identify with the 
dichotomous terms of "man" and "woman" or "male" and "female."  
And I take issue that we are a "tiny percent" of the 
population.  In fact, about 1 in 2000 births are to intersex 
infants. I believe Ann Fausto-Sterling has placed the incidence 
of intersexuality to be even higher, about 1.7% of the 
population.  While there are no good numbers regarding the 
amount of trans people in the population, I would put the number 
as somewhere between 1% and 5% of the population.

I find it troubling that intersexuality is being referred to as 
a "disorder" by those who advocate the DSD classification. Why 
must intersex people be identified as "disordered" in order to 
be classified by the medical community? Trans-identity is 
already stigmatized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM) as "gender identity disorder" or "transvestic fetishism." 
Individuals who vary from the oppressive naturalized and 
essentialized categorizations of sex/gender are continually 
being fetishized, objectified, and pathologized. "Disorder" is 
an offensive term that not only stigmatizes trans and intersex 
people; the flip side is that it aids in the myth that non-trans 
and non-intersex people are "normal" and "natural" and 
contributing to the "order" of societal functioning. As a 6'6" 
non-passing genderqueer trans woman, I deal with 
their "normalcy" and "orderliness" every day, and it ain't 
pretty. Those of us who cross the lines of sex and gender are 
punished for our transgressions.  And those who are "gender-
normative" ALSO lose out because they are boxed in by society's 
stultifying obsession with sex and gender purity. I personally 
believe the sex/gender system is poisonous and must be radically 
overhauled.

I don't think anyone in gender studies holds that notion that 
reproduction does not count for anything.  Rather, many of us 
are interested in contesting the notion that ties reproductivity 
to static and essentialized models of sex/gender.  Further, I am 
interested in interrogating the "difference" model which places 
gender in a heterosexist framework.  

The "difference" model lives on, as is evidenced by the 
egregious 20/20 episode which aired last Friday. Basically the 
program re-asserted (yet again) the "naturalness" of sex/gender 
differences and located the source of these differences in the 
brain. One woman stated that post-natal hormones after pregnancy 
made many women unable or uninterested to re-enter the 
workforce, while a sex therapist recommended that a woman with 
low libido "surrender" to her husband by going on a surrender 
date in which he made all the decisions: from what she wears, to 
where they dine, to what sex they have.  This was because the 
therapist said that the woman "wore the pants" in the 
relationship and thus a reassertion of male dominance would 
awaken her repressed sexual desire, since women "naturally" 
respond to male sexual dominance. I kid you not; these 
genderist, sexist and misogynistic things are being said in 
2006! It doesn't take a whole lot of critical thought to see how 
these sexist assertions can be used to put women back in the 
home and make them "surrender" to male heteropatriarchal 
domination.

I agree with Jeannie that the sex/gender distinction in women's 
studies should, ideally, be challenged. I think it is a 
distinction which has largely outworn its usefulness.  As a 
person who has done a myriad of panels on transgender, it can be 
a useful building block for teaching those who have no 
understanding of the complexity of sex, gender and sexuality.  
However, the down-side is that it often reinscribes a belief in 
the natural division between "male" and "female" even as 
deconstructs the artifice of masculinity and femininity and the 
social roles of gender.

As we all weather this continual gender backlash, I hope that 
the progress offered by trans and intersex studies within 
women's/gender studies will continue to be welcomed for the ways 
these epistemological interventions often challenge 
the "naturalness" of sexual dimorphism and present the radical 
constructedness of sex/gender categorizations.

- Joelle Ruby Ryan 

 May I suggest for those who would like to revisit (or visit) the important
feminist sex/gender debate some readings that expand Chithra's excellent
summation --

Sex-Gender References

Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex".
New York: Routledge.
Cealey Harrison,Wendy and John Hood-Williams. (2002). Beyond sex and gender.
London: Sage. 
Cealey Harrison, Wendy. (2006). "The shadow and the substance: The
sex/gender debate." In Handbook of Gender and Women's Studies, edited by
Kathy Davis, Mary Evans, and Judith Lorber. London: Sage.
Connell, R. W. Masculinities. (1995). Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Herdt, G. (Ed.). (1994). Third sex third gender: Beyond sexual dimorphism in
culture and history. New York: Zone Books.
Kessler, S. J. & McKenna, W. ([1978] 1985). Gender: An ethnomethodological
approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lorber, J. (1994). Paradoxes of gender. Part I. Producing Gender. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
_____. (2005). Breaking the bowls: Degendering and feminist change. Chaps. 1
and 5. New York, Norton.
Lorber, J. & Moore, L. J. (2007). Gendered bodies: Feminist perspectives.
Los Angeles: CA: Roxbury.
Martin, E. (1987). The woman in the body: A cultural analysis of
reproduction. Boston: Beacon Press.  
West, C. & Zimmerman, D. (1987). Doing gender. Gender & Society 1, 125-151.

 
Judith

 
****************************************************************
Judith Lorber, Ph.D.
Professor Emerita
Graduate School and Brooklyn College, CUNY
jlorber  AT  rcn.com
 
Imagine ... the world without gender
********************************************************************

For those who still consider sexual dimorphism to be a biological and 
scientific fact, may I suggest you consider the perspective of this 
biologist/professor at Stanford:

Roughgarden, J. _Evolution's Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and 
Sexuality in Nature and People_. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004.


To get a brief sense of her perspective and work, you can look at 
this article, easily downloadable from Project Muse:

Roughgarden, J. "Evolution and the embodiment of gender." _GLQ: A 
Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies_. 10 (2004):287-291.


-- 
Kami Chisholm
Lecturer, Gender and Women's Studies
3416 Dwinelle
University of California, Berkeley
kchisholm  AT  berkeley.edu

> From: Daphne Patai [in another thread]
>
> 1. If violence is attributed to misogyny, how does one explain that in
> the U.S. (2004 data)  more than 75% of the murder victims are men?

This is exactly the kind of flawed logic, confusion, and conflation of
sex and gender that my original post complained about. It takes a body
count with a strong sex difference and makes an assumption about
gendered motives based on that sex correlation alone. This is not
rigorous logic or scrupulous thinking. 

The failure of scholars to understand that you just can't do this,
especially among scholars who think of themselves as well versed in
feminist theory or social science, points to the need for
broader/greater/deeper understanding of the sex gender conceptual
distinction. 

The sex of victims alone tells you absolutely nothing about gendered
motives for violence. 

However, the research on perpetrators of violence tells us that many
violent men (I am talking about Anglophone countries here which is the
research I am familiar with) talk about perceived slights (which can
include actions or inactions on the part of others) that call into
question their straightness/"manliness"/masculinity as primary
motivations for violence against women AND men. This is a gendered
motive that contributes to the observed sex differences in the
perpetration of violence.

BJS says "Most victims and perpetrators in homicides are male

  Male offender/Male victim 65.2% 

  Male offender/Female victim 22.6% 

  Female offender/Male victim 9.7% 

  Female offender/Female victim  2.4%"

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/gender.htm 

88% male perpetrators. An even more pronounced sex difference than that
in victimization. 

But looking at that sex difference would still tell you nothing about
gender on its own. You have to look at gender to learn about gender.

You can't tell anything about the motives for violence from looking at
the victims alone, and it wouldn't make any sense to try to do so. You
have to look at the perpetrators to understand the perpetration of
violence. The research is very clear that there are sex and gender
differences in the etiology of violence. We need to be aware of both to
understand it fully. Different forms of violence display very different
patterns too, so they have to be studied individually and in the context
of the larger picture.

And I have never seen anyone claim that violence has one cause, much
less that the one cause is misogyny. This is certainly not a common
position. Violence, like every other form of human behavior, has
multiple contributing factors.


Molly Dragiewicz
Assistant Professor
Faculty of Criminology, Justice, and Policy Studies
University of Ontario Institute of Technology

Molly.Dragiewicz  AT  uoit.ca