Seminole Tribe of
--
http://laws.findlaw.com/US/000/u10198.html
Vote: 5 (Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas)
4 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens)
Opinion of the Court: Rehnquist
Dissenting opinions: Souter, Stevens
On
In 1988 Congress passed the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act in order to control gambling on Indian reservations. The
act was passed pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which
gives Congress authority to “regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.”
Among other things, the act provides that Class III gambling (slot machines,
casinos, dog racing, lotteries, etc.) is lawful only if (1) it takes place in a
state that allows such gambling, (2) it is authorized by a valid tribal
ordinance, and (3) it is conducted in conformance with a tribal-state compact.
The law further provides that, upon the request of a tribe, the state must
negotiate such a tribal-state compact “in good faith.” If the tribe does not
believe the state is negotiating in such terms, it may sue the state in federal
court.
In 1991 the Seminole Tribe contacted
The tribe filed suit in federal court alleging a failure by the state to
negotiate in good faith. The state moved to dismiss the suit, citing the
Eleventh Amendment, which bars states from being sued in federal court without
their permission. The district court refused to dismiss the suit, citing the
case of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas (1989), which held that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar federal lawsuits against states if they were authorized
by Congress under its power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed, holding that Congress
lacked the authority, under its power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes,
to make an exception to the immunity from lawsuits granted to the states by the
Eleventh Amendment. The Seminole tribe requested Supreme Court review of that
ruling.
chief justice rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner sought our review of the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and we granted certiorari, in order to consider
[the question]: Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress from authorizing
suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to
enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause? ...
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the
Although the text of the Amendment
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts, “we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much
for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms.” Blatchford
v.
Here, petitioner has sued the State of
... [O]
In only one other case has congressional abrogation of the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity been upheld. In
In arguing that Congress through the Act abrogated the States’ sovereign
immunity, petitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that
the Act was passed pursuant to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Interstate Commerce Clause. Instead, accepting the lower court’s conclusion
that the Act was passed pursuant to Congress’ power under the Indian Commerce
Clause, petitioner now asks us to consider whether that clause grants Congress
the power to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.
Petitioner begins with the plurality decision in Union Gas and contends
that “[t]here is no principled basis for finding that congressional power under
the Indian Commerce Clause is less than that conferred by the Interstate
Commerce Clause.” ... Contending that the Indian Commerce Clause vests the
Federal Government with “the duty of protect[ing]” the tribes from “local ill
feeling” and “the people of the States,” United States v. Kagama (1886),
petitioner argues that the abrogation power is necessary “to protect the tribes
from state action denying federally guaranteed rights.”
Respondents dispute the petitioner’s analogy between the Indian Commerce Clause
and the Interstate Commerce Clause. They note that we have recognized that “the
Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different
applications,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
Both parties make their arguments from the plurality decision in Union Gas....
... We agree with the petitioner that
the plurality opinion in Union Gas allows
no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn between the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Respondents argue, however, that we need not conclude that the Indian Commerce
Clause grants the power to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity. Instead,
they contend that if we find the rationale of the Union Gas plurality to
extend to the Indian Commerce Clause, then “Union Gas should be
reconsidered and overruled.” Generally, the principle of stare decisis, and the
interests that it serves, viz., “the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, ... reliance on
judicial decisions, and ... the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process,” Payne v. Tennessee (1991), counsel strongly against
reconsideration of our precedent. Nevertheless, we always have treated stare
decisis as a “principle of policy,” Helvering v. Hallock (1940), and not as an “inexorable command,” Payne.
“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this Court
has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’“
The Court in Union Gas reached a result without an expressed rationale
agreed upon by a majority of the Court. We have already seen that Justice
Brennan’s opinion received the support of only three other Justices.... Since
it was issued, Union Gas has created confusion among the lower courts
that have sought to understand and apply the deeply fractured decision.
The plurality’s rationale also deviated sharply from our established federalism
jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated our decision in Hans. It was
well established in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that the Eleventh
Amendment stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity
limited the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III. The text of the
Amendment itself is clear enough on this point. ... And our decisions since Hans
had been equally clear that the Eleventh Amendment reflects “the fundamental
principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority
in Article III,” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
(1984). As the dissent in Union Gas recognized, the plurality’s
conclusion--that Congress could under Article I expand the scope of the federal
courts’ jurisdiction under Article III--”contradict[ed] our unvarying approach
to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal
court jurisdiction.” Union Gas.
Never before the decision in Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds
of Article III could be expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any
constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it had
seemed fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III. Marbury v.
In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proven to be a
solitary departure from established law. Reconsidering the decision in Union
Gas, we conclude that none of the policies underlying stare decisis require
our continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has, since its issuance,
been of questionable precedential value, largely because a majority of the
Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality. The case
involved the interpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be altered
only by constitutional amendment or revision by this Court. Finally, both the
result in Union Gas and the plurality’s rationale depart from our
established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted
function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was
wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled.
The dissent makes no effort to defend the decision in Union Gas, but
nonetheless would find congressional power to abrogate in this case. Contending
that our decision is a novel extension of the Eleventh Amendment, the dissent
chides us for “attend[ing]” to dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not to
mere obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established rationale upon which the
Court based the results of its earlier decisions.... For over a century, we
have grounded our decisions in the oft-repeated understanding of state
sovereign immunity as an essential part of the Eleventh Amendment....
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not
so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the
regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the
exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests
in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner’s suit
against the State of
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of
It is so ordered.
justice
stevens, dissenting.
This case is about power--the power
of the Congress of the
The importance of the majority’s decision to overrule the Court’s holding in Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co. cannot be overstated. The majority’s opinion does not
simply preclude Congress from establishing the rather curious statutory scheme
under which Indian tribes may seek the aid of a federal court to secure a
State’s good faith negotiations over gaming regulations. Rather, it prevents
Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against
States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning
bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.
There may be room for debate over whether, in light of the Eleventh Amendment,
Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be enforced in
federal court by a citizen of another State or a foreign citizen. There can be
no serious debate, however, over whether Congress has the power to ensure that
such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State being sued.
Congress’ authority in that regard is clear....
justice
souter, with whom justice ginsburg and justice breyer join, dissenting.
In holding the State of
The fault I find with the majority today is not in its decision to reexamine Union
Gas, for the Court in that case produced no majority for a single rationale
supporting congressional authority. Instead, I part company from the Court
because I am convinced that its decision is fundamentally mistaken, and for
that reason I respectfully dissent....
There is an even more fundamental ... principle, however, that the Court
abandons today. John Marshall recognized it over a century and a half ago in
the very context of state sovereign immunity in federal question cases:
“The jurisdiction of the Court, then,
being extended by the letter of the constitution to all cases arising under it,
or under the laws of the United States, it follows that those who would
withdraw any case of this description from that jurisdiction, must sustain the
exemption they claim on the spirit and true meaning of the constitution, which
spirit and true meaning must be so apparent as to overrule the words which its
framers have employed.” Cohens v.
Because neither
text, precedent, nor history supports the majority’s abdication of our
responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to us in Article III, I
would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.